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The New York Bar and Reform of the Elected Judiciary After the Civil War
Renée Lettow Lerner*
rlerner@law.gwu.edu
(202) 994-5776
Abstract
This paper deals with the history of America’s other peculiar institution: the elected
judiciary. Elected judges are found virtually nowhere else in the world, but in America they are
a fact of life in the considerable majority of states. The history of the elected judiciary is
surprisingly little explored. This paper examines the post-Civil War trend away from Jacksonian
populism and toward a more aristocratic view of the judiciary as a body set apart from the
people. After the Civil War, many states, including New York, lengthened terms of office for
their elected judges; some states even switched back to an appointive system. In New York, this
reform was sparked by a perception of rampant corruption among New York City judges. The
paper delves into the little-understood areas of how elected judges were nominated and how they
campaigned in the late nineteenth century. The judicial elections process is set against the social
backdrop of massive immigration into New York City and the resulting rise of the Tweed Ring.
The paper describes the Ring’s corruption of key members of the judiciary, together with the
ethnic rancor ignited by allegations of judicial corruption. Leading the judicial reform efforts
were members of the elite bar. The paper discusses the backgrounds of elite lawyers and their
role in lengthening judicial terms and in founding the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. The Association proved active in working to impeach the most notorious judges of the
Tammany Hall Ring. For some time, many worried that the lack of a sound judiciary would
cause New York’s newly burgeoning economy to collapse, much like the difficulties a corrupt
judiciary poses in developing countries today. In the end, New York was able to reform the
judiciary sufficiently that persons and property were reasonably secure, and New York’s rise to
commercial prominence could continue.
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I.

Introduction
This Article sheds light on America’s other peculiar institution: the elected judiciary.

While slavery has existed in many times and places, electing judges is almost unique in modern
history.1 This distinctive American practice has recently attracted a great deal of attention, both
in legal circles and in the popular press: the U.S. Supreme Court launched into an already fierce
debate with an opinion on speech rights of judicial candidates;2 newspapers routinely run articles
about contributions to judicial campaigns and allegations of judicial bias;3 and legions of law
review articles propose reforms.4
1

One exception is the election of judges in France beginning in 1790 during the French
Revolution. MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE
CROSS-EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 55-69 (1988). The French
government discontinued the practice when Napoléon Bonaparte took power in 1799, and never
again held judicial elections. Id. at 99-100. I have not found any other examples of popularly
elected judges in modern times. It therefore appears that, apart from one European country for a
short time undergoing unprecedented upheaval, no other society has embarked on such an
experiment.
2

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).

3

Leslie Eaton, After Scandals, State Panel Offers Plan to Revamp Judges’ Elections, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003; Editorial, Judicial Elections: Reform is Needed, But Proposals Are Just a
Start, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 14, 2003; Mark Scolforo, Election of Judges in Pennsylvania
Criticized: Some Candidates Question a System That Forces Them to Raise Money from Those
Who May Appear Before Them, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, October 13, 2003; Robert Duncan,
Legislators Renew Effort to Appoint Texas Judges: Group Says Elections Bad for Reputation,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 4, 2003; Editorial, It’s Time to Reform Selection of Judges: Texas’
Judicial Elections Are Dysfunctional Because of the Influence of Big Money and Partisan Tides,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 5, 2003; Thomas Moyer, Editorial, Cash v. Quality: Ohio’s
Judicial Elections Smell More of Money Than Merit, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio),
Mar. 5, 2003; Jonathan Groner, Mississippi: Battleground for Tort Reform: Business Lobby and
Trial Lawyers Gear Up for Judicial Elections, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004.
4

Following is a small sample of what has become a vast outpouring: Jared Lyles, The
Buying of Justice: Perversion of the Legal System Through Interest Groups’ Involvement with
the Partisan Election of Judges, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121 (2003); Paul D. Carrington, Big
Money in Texas Judicial Elections: The Sickness and Its Remedies, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 263
1

What this new attention to judicial elections recognizes is that a reasonably competent
and unbiased judiciary (or judge-like civil service) is important, if not essential, in ensuring the
rule of law and economic prosperity.5 The lack of an adequate judiciary has plagued many
countries in their efforts to modernize and develop: the list of afflicted countries includes Russia,
China, Indonesia, and many others.6 As it happens, the United States itself has plenty of
experience with judicial corruption and judicial reform. New York City, now long the nation’s
undisputed commercial capital, faced after the Civil War an elected judiciary so corrupt and
incompetent that leading citizens feared economic and social collapse. This Article tells the
story of how New York pulled back from the brink.
There is no question that the voters of New York played an important role in ratifying
reforms of the judiciary. But the reforms were initiated in the first place by elites, especially
elites in the bar. Many scholars take a dim view of the elite bar during this period, and hold fast
(2000); Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections,
the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301 (2003); Richard
R.W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship
Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609 (2002).
5

The “rule of law” can be an elastic concept, as Robert Gordon has recently pointed out.
Robert W. Gordon, Can Lawyers Produce the Rule of Law?, paper presented at the George
Washington University Law School workshop, Sept. 24, 2004, at 1 & n.3. Here, I am referring
to the basic ability to protect property rights, enforce contracts, and ensure the physical safety
and liberty of citizens. See also William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723.
6

The United States has already made and is continuing serious efforts to aid many of
these countries in shaping up their legal systems, including their judiciaries. See Richard Van
Duizend, Strengthening the Administration of Justice Overseas, 42 JUDGES’ J. 39 (2003)
(describing extensive U.S. efforts to improve justice systems in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, including involvement of and funding from the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the National Center for State Courts, and the American Bar
Association). The election of judges in many states may cause international observers to
question whether the United States is up to the job of advising others on matters such as judicial
selection.
2

to the idea that the new bar organizations following the Civil War, despite lip service they may
have paid to public aims, were basically exclusionary and anti-competitive devices designed to
keep out social and economic undesirables.7 One need not reject that critique entirely to
recognize that more public-regarding motives may also have existed.8 Whatever the faults of
elites, they can have their uses. The elites I am referring to here were well-educated, with at
least some modest means, sometimes from families with traditions of local leadership, and
generally honest reputations. Tocqueville pointed out the crucial role such individuals could
play as members of the bar: “the prestige accorded to lawyers and their permitted influence in
the government are now the strongest barriers against the faults of democracy.”9 Elite lawyers
aspired to serve as a sort of mediating force correcting the excesses of both the grasping

7

The most prominent exponents of this view include JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); MAXWELL H.
BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876 (1976); RICHARD L.
ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving
Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977).
8

It is worth paying attention to what the reformers themselves believed they were doing,
and taking a close look at their accomplishments. See Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the
Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW
HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST CIVIL WAR AMERICA 53-57 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed. 1984);
Robert Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 18701920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1730-1940 (Gerald L.
Geison, ed. 1983). The Association of the Bar of the City of New York found a sympathetic, but
not uncritical, historian for its centennial. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1870-1970
(1970). Lewis Grossman has skillfully traced the reforming career of one of its most prominent
members. See Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20
LAW AND HIST. REV. 577 (2002) (discussing Carter’s anti-codification efforts).
9

1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 263.
3

nouveaux riches and the penniless immigrant hordes bent on redistribution.10 With their
“penchant for order” and “natural love of forms,” elite lawyers hoped to form a Tocquevillian
aristocracy keeping the polity on an even keel. In the case of the New York bar, at least, one can
be grateful that “hidden at the bottom of a lawyer’s soul one finds some of the tastes and habits
of an aristocracy.”11
While scholars have paid attention to the populist origins of judicial elections,12 virtually
no one has traced their later history, influenced by elites.13 Following a well-documented wave
of populism before the Civil War, a backlash began.14 Many of the state constitutions written
and ratified before the Civil War embodied the populist Jacksonian principle of giving power

10

This is, as Robert Gordon has pointed out, the role of “the few” in classical republican
theory. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual,” supra, at 56. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, bk.
VII, ch. 9-10 (Carnes Lord, trans. 1984).
11

1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 264.

12

Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993); Kermit L. Hall, The
Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860,
45 HISTORIAN 337 (1983).
13

Even James Willard Hurst, normally so attuned to issues of judicial structure and
selection, hardly mentions the reforms discussed here. JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 122-123 (1950).
14

In some ways this cycle of populism and elite reaction paralleled an earlier cycle.
During the populist Revolutionary era, the judiciary was under grave suspicion, and the powers
of legislatures and juries exalted in state constitutions. This period was quickly followed by the
federalist era, including the framing of the federal Constitution and the first decade or more of
the nineteenth century. During the Federalist era, the structural importance of an independent
and powerful judiciary was recognized, and judges, copying their English counterparts, adopted
various means to assert control over jury verdicts. I have written about this first attempt to roll
back populism through a strengthened judiciary in Renée B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict
Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 505 (1996).
4

directly to the people. These constitutions provided for frequent election of all government
officials–including judges–and rotation in office.15 But a reaction to Jacksonianism set in
immediately after the Civil War, when the effects of these changes began to be felt in earnest.
Lawyers and judges of both parties, the intellectual (and sometimes physical) heirs of the
Federalists and Whigs,16 began to denounce the populist constitutions as “novel experiments”
that with time had proved to be failures.
These elite lawyers argued in favor of a type of reform that I call re-anglicizing the
bench. They wanted to make the state judiciaries more English in structure and urged that new
constitutional conventions return to appointments for life for the judiciary or at least provide
longer elective terms, using the English and federal judiciaries as models.17 The independence of
the judiciary was their rallying cry. In several states, including New York, these reformers

15

The Jacksonian movement prompted other changes affecting the processes of lawmaking, the bench, and the bar. Referenda came into vogue. Powers of judges over juries,
including the ability to comment on evidence at trial, were limited. Renée Lettow Lerner, The
Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195
(2000). State constitutions and legislatures swept away most qualifications for the bar,
essentially opening the bar to all comers.
16

This link between Whig ideology and the Gilded Age reformers is beginning to be
better appreciated. Robert Gordon noted it some time ago, and Lewis Grossman has lately
discussed it. See Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual,” supra, at 56; Grossman, supra, at 581.
17

These efforts on behalf of the judiciary were part of a broad reform movement which
also aimed at ending corruption in state legislatures and in municipal government, partly by
introducing civil service reform. See, e.g., ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT, 1865-1883 (1961). Re-anglicizing the
bench might also have a double meaning, hinting at filling the bench with men of sturdy English
stock rather than more recent immigrants. Some reformers may have had this in mind as well,
but it appears the reformers would have been happier with honest Irishmen than corrupt Yankees
on the bench. See infra Part IV.A.
5

actually succeeded.18
New York provides an especially important example of these attempts to reform and reanglicize the bench. New York’s events were important in their own right and highly influential
throughout the country because of the state’s commercial prominence and because it was one of
the first to adopt an elective judiciary and one of the first to try to reform it. New York’s
Constitution of 1846 was one of the earliest to exhibit full-blown Jacksonian populism and to
provide for an elective judiciary, encouraging other states to follow suit. Around the same time,
New York was definitively emerging as the most important commercial center in America.
As a result of New York City’s importance in banking, shipping, and other industries, its bar
produced some of the best legal talent in the nation and attracted it from other regions of the
country, especially New England.
However, as Part II of this Article discusses, New York City after the Civil War also had
a deeply corrupt judiciary; contemporary observers believed it to be one of the most, if not the

18

Before the Civil War, 24 of the 34 states elected at least some judges. But, as one
speaker in 1887 put it, “[t]he changes since 1860 indicate an opposite tendency–either in the
lengthening of judicial terms in States still retaining the election, or in the abandonment of that
system by some States.” HENRY HITCHCOCK, ADDRESS BEFORE THE NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, Jan. 18, 1887. See also 2 J. HAMPDEN DOUGHERTY, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK 176-177 (1911). Five states–Virginia, Louisiana, Florida, Maine, and
Connecticut–eventually decided to abandon judicial elections altogether and go back to an
appointive system. Id. Other states were not willing to go as far as that, but did lengthen judicial
terms considerably. In 1873, Pennsylvania’s new constitution lengthened the terms of supreme
court judges from fifteen to twenty-one years, and of other judges from five to ten years. In
1875, Missouri lengthened the terms of supreme court judges from six to ten years, and the
judges of two recently-created intermediate appellate courts was made twelve years. In 1883,
Ohio’s legislature was authorized to fix a term for judges not less than five years. (Since 1851,
the constitutional term for judges in Ohio was five years.) California changed the term of
supreme court judges from ten to twelve years. Maryland changed the terms of all judges from
ten to fifteen years. Id.
6

most, corrupt in the country. The effects of the Constitution of 1846, combined with massive
immigration and the rise of the Tweed Ring, encouraged this corruption. Reformers warned
ominously that New York City could lose its commercial preeminence and indeed sink into
“barbarism” if steps were not taken to reform the judiciary. Part III describes the world of elite
members of the New York bar, lawyers who hailed from both New York and New England.
These individuals represented New York’s best chance of cleaning up the bench.
As Part IV shows, the elite New York bar eventually rose to the challenge. The elite
bar’s success was due in part to its ability to get its members elected to the constitutional
convention of 1867-68, and, once there, to their focus on lengthening judicial terms rather than
abolishing the elective system for judges. At the convention of 1867-68, reformers–especially
elite lawyers–attacked the problem of judicial corruption in one of the earliest efforts to reverse
the tide of Jacksonianism and to re-anglicize the bench. The convention proposed, and the
people ratified, an amendment to the New York constitution lengthening judicial terms. After
further judicial scandals attracting attention in the local and national press, the elite bar formed
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The Association was small but deliberately
bipartisan, and at least occasionally could successfully focus on getting honest judges on the
bench and removing corrupt ones. Although a state-wide referendum on returning to an
appointive judiciary failed in 1873, enough had been accomplished that the New York judiciary
was once again functioning at a respectable level. New York’s rise to national and international
commercial success could continue, and its citizens could be reasonably assured of respect for
their persons and property.

7

II.

The Threat of “Hopeless Barbarism”: The Elite Bar’s Perception of Problems in the
New York Judiciary and Legal System After the Civil War
In July 1867 an article appeared in the North American Review, perhaps the leading

general review in the country,19 entitled “The Judiciary of New York City.”20 No author was
attributed.21 The article sent shock-waves through the New York bench and bar, and tremors
throughout the country. Although it did not name names, it described specific instances of
corruption in ways that allowed easy identification of participants and alleged that such
corruption was widespread. No court or branch of law in the city was immune, the article
suggested. Furthermore, lawyers were forced to go along with this system or risk losing their
practices, and so the bar was corrupted as well as the bench. The article opens a window into the
way the elite bar perceived the legal system at the time. It discussed four main sources or
examples of judicial corruption: judicial elections, abuse of injunctive powers, patronage
problems with referees and receivers, and abuse of criminal justice. Other elite lawyers
commented on each of these problems in private diaries and other sources, and I will discuss

19

The editor of the North American Review was the reformer Charles Eliot Norton, the
distinguished Harvard classicist and the first president of the Archeological Institute of America.
See GERALD W. MCFARLAND, MUGWUMPS, MORALS, AND POLITICS, 1884-1920, at 47 (1975).
20

[Thomas G. Shearman], The Judiciary of New York City, 58 NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW
149 (July 1867).
21

The article was reputed to have been written by Thomas G. Shearman (ultimately
founder of the firm known today as Shearman and Sterling). Charles Francis Adams, Jr., in a
footnote to another article in the North American Review on the Erie railroad scandal in July
1869, attributed the earlier article to Shearman. Shearman seems never to have denied that he
wrote the July 1867 piece. One of David Dudley Field’s partners and his right-hand man,
Shearman was viewed by others in the bar as one of the contributors to the very corruption of
which he wrote. DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW
226-227 (1986).
8

each of these four areas in turn. The North American Review article convinced many that deepseated reform in the judiciary was needed if New York was to retain its status as a premier
commercial city and state under the rule of law.
A brief description of court organization in New York is necessary here to understand the
article’s allegations. The court of last resort in New York was the Court of Appeals, half of
whose members held fixed terms on the court and half of whom were trial judges (from the
Supreme Court) who rotated on and off the Court of Appeals each year. The trial court of
general jurisdiction was the Supreme Court.22 In addition, there were local judges composing the
County Courts and the Surrogates’ Court (these latter handling mainly probate matters). Within
the City of New York, there were two additional civil courts whose jurisdiction essentially
overlapped: the Superior Court and the Court of Common Pleas.23 The criminal courts in the city
included those held by the justices of the Supreme Court and judges known as the Recorder and
the City Judge; these heard more serious cases requiring jury trial. Other courts, composed of
police justices, heard petty offenses and held prisoners to bail.
A.

Judicial Elections

Shearman’s article described the control corrupt party bosses wielded over the judiciary
as a result of elections and short terms. But the populist Constitution of 1846, he said, did not
immediately give rise to this control. For “some years” after election of judges began,
candidates for the more important courts were generally “men of high character and respectable

22

Members of the Supreme Court sometimes formed an appellate body known as the
general term. 2 DOUGHERTY, supra, at 168-169.
23

There was also in the city a Marine Court, with jurisdiction over claims of less than
$500, and eight civil justices, who heard claims of less importance. Id.
9

abilities.”24 Some of the first judges elected had already served for a considerable period on the
bench.25 But this happy situation did not continue. One of the reasons for the change for the
worse, Shearman wrote, was the huge number of immigrants flooding the city.26
The impact of immigration on New York City in a very short time is difficult to imagine
today. Shearman noted that the census of 1860 had counted 77,475 foreign-born voters in New
York City, and only 51,500 native ones.27 Naturalizations had been so great since then that, he
estimated, current figures would show about 100,000 foreign-born voters to 60,000 native ones.
Between 1840 and 1870, New York’s overall population more than tripled, reaching an official
count of 942,292.28 Even that number may be low: the Office of the Census arrived at that figure
only after revising its original count of 726,386 amid charges of a politically-inspired
undercounting.29 Whatever the precise figure, New York’s population was exploding due to
immigration: by 1870, a large proportion of New Yorkers had been born overseas, with Ireland
and the German states being the most common nations of origin.30 These immigrants fled to
America because of the dire hardships surrounding the potato famines and political tumult that

24

Shearman, supra, at 150.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

See ALEXANDER B. CALLOW, JR., THE TWEED RING 61 (1966).

29

See SEYMOUR J. MANDELBAUM, JR., BOSS TWEED’S NEW YORK 7 (1965).

30

See id. at 8; see also EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF
NEW YORK CITY TO 1898 1111-12 (1999).
10

afflicted both nations in the 1840's and beyond.31 Although Shearman did not explicitly say so,
the Irish were the chief concern of many natives. Natives were alarmed at their perceived
penchant for whiskey, their tolerance of dirt,32 their growing control of city government, and
their use of it to funnel money to local bosses and to give sinecures to their retainers. Old New
Yorker George Templeton Strong, in his famous diaries, wryly noted New York City’s
submission to the “rod and scepter of Maguires and O’Tooles and O’Shanes.”33
Shearman said the problem was not so much that the immigrants almost unanimously
supported the Democratic party, since many Democrats preferred honest officials to dishonest
ones. The problem was that as between two Democrats, the immigrants always preferred the
worst.34 “Such voters,” he wrote, three times elected the notorious Fernando Wood as mayor,
and twice sent him to Congress. The tenement slums in which these immigrants lived proved a
fertile breeding ground for Tweed’s Ring.35 Although the Ring was generally associated with the
31

See CALLOW, supra, at 61.

32

Shearman wrote that an immense majority of the foreign-born in New York were “of an
ignorant and demoralized class; and their mode of living by no means tends to their
improvement. John Wesley wisely said that cleanliness was next to godliness; and judged by
that standard, thousands of tenement-houses in New York are to the last degree ungodly.”
Shearman, supra, at 151. See also MATTHEW PATRICK BREEN, THIRTY YEARS OF NEW YORK
POLITICS UP-TO-DATE 212 (1899) (describing tale told by newly-arrived Irish immigrant about
his squalid lodgings at a judicial nominating convention). Shearman declared it was impossible
that such places should be the homes of “intelligent and truly patriotic electors.” The people
who lived there were not degraded by poverty, for those in rural districts were often poorer, but
“hopelessly degraded by dirt, foul air, and drink.” Shearman, supra, at 151.
33

4 THE DIARY OF GEORGE TEMPLETON STRONG 273 (Allan Nevins & Milton H. Thomas
ed., 1974) [hereinafter STRONG DIARIES].
34

Id.

35

City services began to collapse under the weight of immigration, and crime increased.
See EDWARD CRAPSEY, THE NETHER SIDE OF NEW YORK 45-46 (1872). The black-Irish riots
11

Democratic party, in that Tweed and the other ringleaders were elected as Democrats, the Ring
also bought plenty of Republicans.36 Tammany Hall, in existence long before Tweed’s rise, was
already attempting to enlist the support of new immigrants by 1828.37 Tweed skillfully garnered
to himself immense support in the city. By 1850, Tweed had begun his rise to power. In that
year, Tammany Hall ran Tweed for alderman in a successful campaign. At first sight, Tweed’s
dominance of the machine is surprising. Although not a recent immigrant himself–Tweed’s
ancestry was Scottish, and his forebears had come to New York in the mid-eighteenth
century–Tweed cleverly appealed to the newcomers.38
The immigrants’ influence was of course felt in judicial elections as well, and the elite
bar was not happy with the results. Shearman blamed these voters for the ejection of Judge
raised levels of disorder, and the policing system, such as it was, failed. Even postal service
within the city began to break down. See MANDELBAUM, supra, at 19.
36

As a leading opponent of Tweed, the Democrat Samuel J. Tilden, pointed out, “The
very definition of a Ring is that it encircles enough influential men in the organization of each
party to control the action of both party machines,–men who in public push to extremes the
abstract ideas of their respective parties, while they secretly join their hands in schemes for
personal power and profit.” 1 SAMUEL J. TILDEN, TILDEN’S PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
561 (John Bigelow, ed., New York, Harper and Brothers, 1885) (2 vols.). According to a
contemporary observer, Tweed had a special side door cut into his office wall so that members of
the opposing party who did not wish to be seen making deals with him could slip in and out.
Breen, supra, at 43-44.
37

Other political factions were not so quick to do so, and indeed tried to play the nativist
card. See DENIS T. LYNCH, “BOSS” TWEED: THE STORY OF A GRIM GENERATION 115-21 (1927);
CALLOW, supra, at 20-22. In 1857, the Republican party, which controlled the state legislature
at Albany, attempted to neutralize the effect of immigration on New York politics by passing a
new Municipal Charter. That charter gave Albany direct control over many city functions,
including the police force, and was much resented by immigrants. See Tyler G. Anbinder,
Fernando Wood and New York City’s Succession from the Union: A Political Reappraisal, 68
N.Y. HIST. 67, 68-77 (1987).
38

OLIVER E. ALLEN, THE TIGER: THE RISE AND FALL OF TAMMANY HALL 83 (1993). See
also LYNCH, supra, at 37-38.
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Bosworth, a life-long Democrat, from the Superior Court in 1863, although his replacement “did
not, in all probability, receive the votes of a thousand respectable men.”39 The worthy Judge
Bosworth’s failure to gain his party’s renomination was to become a cause célèbre among
reformers, repeatedly referred to in the debates at the 1867-68 Constitutional Convention.40
Bosworth had attracted Tweed’s ire because of the interference of the bench with the frauds of
the Common Council.41 This interference “opened the eyes of the plunderers of the public to the
necessity of controlling the civil courts, which they had previously overlooked.” Tweed, not
mentioned by name but described as a “notorious corruptionist,” arranged for Bosworth and
another “worthy and capable” Democratic judge to lose the renomination because Tweed
“declared he must and would have one friend on whom he could rely in each of the city courts of
record.”42 Bosworth was replaced by the Irish-born John H. McCunn,43 later removed from
office by the state senate for corruption. While in office, Judge McCunn did not disappoint his
political master. He was most noted for conducting fraudulent naturalization proceedings, which

39

Shearman, supra, at 152.

40

See infra text accompanying notes ___.

41

Shearman, supra, at 154.
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Id. Shearman describes another incident in which Tweed, in 1861, made a great show
of his virtue in nominating two honest candidates to the Superior Court, Hoffman and Woodruff,
at the Democratic Convention. He then collected a large sum from them for “election expenses.”
But at the eleventh hour he sold them out for $10,000 cash, paid for by friends of “the regular
Democratic candidates,” whose names Tweed then substituted. “One of the judges thus elected
has procured a seat in the New York Constitutional Convention, and can doubtless give valuable
suggestions to his associates upon the advantages of an elected judiciary.” Id. See Judge Daly’s
comments on Woodruff infra text accompanying notes ___.
43

McCunn was a sailor from County Derry who, after arriving in New York, got initial
help from the eminent and well-respected lawyer Charles O’Conor. MARTIN, supra, at 76.
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not surprisingly took place just before elections. Machine bosses would round up dozens of
immigrants at a time and bring them before Judge McCunn to be hastily naturalized.44 The press
lampooned these proceedings. The Tribune commented, “It is rumored that Judge McCunn has
issued an order naturalizing all the lower counties of Ireland, beginning at Tipperary and running
down to Cork. Judge Barnard [another Tweed judge] will arrange for the northern counties at
the next sitting of Chambers.”45
Matthew Patrick Breen, a contemporary observer of New York City politics, described
judicial elections under the dominance of the Tweed ring from a close vantage point. As his
name suggests, he was of Irish origin, and he served for some time in municipal government.46
He therefore knew whereof he spoke. His account highlights the importance to the Ring of
controlling the judiciary and judicial patronage. Breen changed the names of the candidates, but
claimed to be describing an actual election.
First Breen described the Democratic judicial nominating convention, most likely for a
judge of the Superior Court, noting that the Democratic nomination was equivalent to a
certificate of election.47 The convention swarmed with sycophants.48 “Nor was this degradation
confined to the ignorant. Men of education, men who were members of the learned professions,

44

This at a time when many colored men, born in New York, who had served in the
Union Army, could not vote. See DEBATES AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1867-68.
45

Irish Citizenship, N.Y. TRIBUNE (May 23, 1869). See also W.A. SWANBERG, JIM FISK:
THE CAREER OF AN IMPROBABLE RASCAL (1959) 86.
46

BREEN, supra, at iii.

47

Id. at 207.

48

Id. at 205, 206.
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were in that very body, and vied with the worst in sniveling sycophancy.”49 The crowd of about
400 was a mixed gathering in every sense: “persons who wore diamonds in their white shirtfronts, or in their gaudy neckties, were cheek-by-jowl with those who wore red or blue flannel
shirts smeared with grease or soiled with the smoke of the furnace.”50 Half an hour after the
Convention was supposed to begin, the party leaders had not appeared. Some members of the
rowdy crowd became anxious. “What was the matter? Was there a hitch? Was the “slate”
broken? How could it be? Every man in that hall understood that “Dan” Breezy was to have the
nomination, by the order of Tweed himself, and, what is more, that Tweed had had him admitted
to the bar, only a short time before, expressly in order to qualify him, according to law, for a
Judgeship.”51
But tensions were soon relieved. The “tall form of Mike Hickey, the chief “bugler,” as
he was called, of Alderman Sheehan, appeared at the door, calmly smoking a cigar.”52
Difficulties had arisen because the judicial district covered several wards, and each alderman
wanted a say in the judge’s patronage.
“Everything is all right,” said Mike, assuringly. “You see boys, it’s just like this:
The five leaders is next door in Colbert’s (a liquor shop). There’s a little hitch
about the places to be give’ out by the Judge. Alderman Cooney wants the earth
for his deestrikt, and Alderman Bill Nix wants the sun, moon and stars for his
deestrikt. They thinks they’ll do up Alderman Sheehan, and sneak away the
places in the Court from him; they thinks he’s dead slow, they do; but you bet
your life they can’t throw him down in this business. Then, what d’ye think?
They takes Breezy into the private room and tries to give him the gaff; and they
49

Id. at 207.

50

Id. at 208.
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Id. at 209.

52

Id.
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wants him to sign a paper to give Cooney the Chief Clerk of the Court, when the
Alderman, quick as a flash, says, ‘Not on your life, Breezy; I know the law, and
you das’nt sign no such thing without running up plumb agin it.’ This brace hit
‘em right square, and made ‘em wilt. Then the Alderman, he again, quick as
chain-lightnin,’ says, lookin’ at Breezy and givin’ him the wink, ‘Youse can tell
the gentlemen, by verbal words, what you’ll give ‘em.’ With that, Breezy then
says, sizin’ up the posish, ‘I will do the square thing by youse all; leave it to me.’
But Cooney is a hard one, and he says, ‘No, I wants to get fer my deestrikt the
Chief Clerk,’ says he, ‘and won’t give up that place, nohow.’ It’s all right,
though,” said Mike; “fer the order is give out, and Breezy can’t be side-tracked
fer nobody or fer nothin.”53
Breezy is then chosen the nominee by acclaim, to wild cheering. He launches into his
nomination speech:
“Fellow citizens,” said Mr. Breezy, with a melting pathos in his voice,
“had I twenty lives to expend, this moment is the proudest hour of my life!
(Applause and cries of ‘Bully for you.’) I was brought up amongst you all, the
men, women and children of this district. I know their hearts and minds, and
when you come before me, as Judge, I will be able, from what I know of you, to
decide who is telling the truth and who is telling false. (Applause and cries of
‘That’s so.’) This is the only way a man can give out justice on the square, and I
assure you to-night that, if I didn’t know I had this quality, I never would be a
candidate for the high office of Judge. (Cries of ‘Good for you, we know it.’) Has
my Republican opponent, Isodore Gonsfager,54 any record like this? (‘Never, on
your life!’ shouted a man at the end of the hall, which sally elicited great
cheering.)
“Now, fellow citizens,” continued Mr. Breezy, “I would like to discuss the
National and State issues in this campaign, which I call upon you all to vote for;
but the hour is too late and, without further delay, I want to come down to the
local issue, which his name is Gonsfager. (A voice, ‘That’s what we want.’) Who
is this Gonsfager?” asked Mr. Breezy, with stern countenance and heavy
emphasis. “Who is he? I ask again. I will tell you. He is one of the dandy
graduates of Columbia College Law School. (Sensation, and deep groans for
Gonsfager.) Does he know the people over which he asks to preside? Do the
people know him from a side of sole-leather? (Loud cheering.) How, then, can
he give justice between you? (Cries of ‘You’re the man to do it.’)
“Now, fellow citizens,” he concluded, “the hour is late and your waiting
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Id. at 209-210.
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Probably intended to represent a Jewish name.
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was long. Colbert’s doors are wide open, and I want you to drink to my health,
one and all!”
This timely peroration was manifestly regarded as the most acceptable
part of his speech, for, with one impulse, the entire throng suddenly sprang from
their seats, and, jumping and tumbling over the benches, made a grand rush for
Colbert’s liquor store.55
B.

Abuse of Injunctive Powers

The judges thus elected were not likely to pay strict attention to the niceties of either
judicial ethics or the law. Their ability to wreak havoc–and thus the political bosses’ desire to
control them–was magnified by the fusion of law and equity accomplished in New York’s
Constitution of 1846 and the Field Code of 1848. The fusion of law and equity permitted
ordinary judges, at almost any level, to grant sweeping injunctions, in contrast to the separate
and centralized system of equity that had earlier prevailed, presided over by the renowned
Chancellor Kent. After the fusion, injunctive power was up for grabs, and party bosses exerted
their full influence over elected judges to get injunctions in their favor. Lawyers, also, curried
favor with certain judges through bribes or political influence, to get injunctions for their clients.
Shearman stated: “It is certain that some lawyers can always get an injunction or an attachment,
and keep it in force for weeks, without a respectable ground for it.”56

55

BREEN, supra, at 217-218. Breen also includes a description of Breezy’s “skilful
management of his whirlwind canvass,” and the hapless Gonsfager’s campaign, culminating in
the triumphant election of Breezy. Id. at 242-245. Violence was not unknown at elections in the
late nineteenth century. Parties employed leaders of local street gangs to use their fists to
influence balloting on election day. EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 131
(1979). Election violence was not limited to New York City; John Witt describes an upstate
judicial election in 1894 in which a “gang of rowdies” battled over the ballot box with a group of
policemen. JOHN F. WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 157 (2004).
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Shearman, supra, at 155. See also 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH
455 (1995) (first published 1927) (“Injunctions granted by [Tweed judges] were moves in the
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An example of the way in which certain powerful interests were able to get unreasonable
injunctions was judicial treatment of the excise law. Liquor dealers, Shearman explained,
detested this law because it made real the previous nominal prohibition of liquor sales on
Sundays.57 Liquor dealers managed important centers of immigrant and Ring politics, as the
account of Judge Breezy’s nomination shows.58 The liquor-dealers’ association was anxious to
overturn the law, but was told by its counsel that the law was constitutional and could not be
contested. Other lawyers in New York said the same. Finally, “a well-known lawyer,”
representing a prosperous brewer, gave his opinion that the law could not constitutionally apply
to liquor dealers who held licenses under the old law, until those licenses expired. On this
ground he applied for an injunction. The problem of the “nine-tenths of all the liquor-dealers in
the city” who did not have licenses under the old law was never argued. Nevertheless, the judge
promptly decided that the excise law was “wholly void,” without giving any reason, and issued
approximately seven hundred injunctions that completely halted the operation of the law for six
months. Eventually, the Court of Appeals decided the law was valid in every respect and voided

party game.”).
57

Shearman, supra, at 156. Enforcement was put into hands that were “faithful and
resolute.” Breen also describes how unpopular this law was among German-Americans in New
York. BREEN, supra, at 110-111.
58

See also BREEN, supra, at 111-112; EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 135 (1979). Morris describes Theodore Roosevelt’s near-disastrous meeting with
an influential saloon keeper–“a very important personage” in Roosevelt’s words–in his first
campaign for New York City alderman in 1881. In response to the saloon keeper’s suggestion
that the price of liquor licenses should be lowered, Roosevelt declared they were not high
enough. His Jewish and Irish political managers hastily urged him to go back to his friends on
Fifth Avenue, and they would take care of the “liquor vote” on Sixth Avenue. Id.
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the injunctions.59
One practice that grew up among New York city judges at this time, seemingly as a
natural outgrowth of the judicial culture of favoritism, was that of listening to counsel making
statements about their cases out of court without their opponents being present. Shearman
lamented that the practice had become so common in New York as to excite no remark, although
“it is fatal to real justice.”60 A few years later, in his speech at the founding of the Association of
the Bar, William Evarts made the same complaint.61 As a result of this practice, ex parte
injunctions might suddenly rain down on a hapless lawyer’s client. This was most flagrant in the
litigation surrounding control of the Erie Railroad and the Albany and Susquehanna, discussed
below.62 It also might happen that a judge in such a case pledged his decision beforehand, even
if there was to be an argument in open court later. “We have known extensive stock speculations
to be conducted on the faith of decisions thus promised; and it is not to be wondered at if the
judge was strongly suspected of having an interest, as he certainly had a friend, in the
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Cite to case. Shearman, supra, at 156. Shearman says that not only liquor dealers but
“professional gamblers,” who had obtained representation in Congress and in the state
legislature, had “gained a strong hold upon the courts.” “Several judges have notoriously
attained their offices through the influence of this class, and their indisposition to execute the
law against their best friends is not a matter for surprise.” Id. at 157.
60

Shearman, supra, at 155.
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See infra text accompanying notes ___.
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The Field Code created many problems of overlapping jurisdiction and injunctions. In
addition, many decisions were not reviewable by Court of Appeals, or took a long time to be
appealed. The Court of Appeals was very inefficient because of the yearly rotation among its
members, begun by the Constitution of 1846. See 2 DOUGHERTY, supra, at 159. There were,
therefore, serious problems with inconsistency in the law. See THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS
OF A LAWYERS’ LIFETIME 70-71 (1914) [hereinafter T. STRONG].
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speculation.”63
C.

Patronage Problems: Referees and Receivers

Another power judges wielded that made machine politicians so anxious to get control of
them was patronage. In accordance with their general ideology, the framers of the 1846
Constitution had done their best to strip judges of as much patronage as possible. That
Constitution abolished all offices to which Court of Appeals and Supreme Court judges had
formerly made appointments. But while that Constitution abolished such permanent offices, it
left two very important loopholes in the form of temporary appointments: referees and receivers.
Judges took full advantage of these appointments to feather their nests and to serve the interests
of the Tweed Ring. Two Ring judges in particular, Supreme Court Judges George Barnard and
Albert Cardozo, developed the distribution of patronage into an art form.
It is worth describing these two judges here, since for New York lawyers they, together
with Judge McCunn, epitomized the “Tweed judges.” Whereas the uneducated Irish immigrant
John McCunn was seemingly a natural to become a Ring judge, Cardozo and Barnard are more
surprising and demonstrate the hold the Ring was able to gain among individuals from more
established families by appealing to greed. Albert Cardozo was no recent uneducated immigrant,
but a member of one of New York’s oldest and most distinguished sephardic Jewish families.64
Many of his relatives were lawyers,65 and his son Benjamin was destined to become a justice of
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Shearman, supra, at 155.
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ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 6-7 (1998).

65

See Edgar J. Nathan, Memorial of Michael H. Cardozo, 11 ABCNY REPORTS 134-137

(1906).
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the U.S. Supreme Court.66 But it was not Irish and Jews alone who could be corrupted by the
Ring: Judge Barnard–perhaps the most notorious of all Ring judges–came from a family of
English origin prominent in Poughkeepsie. He and his seven brothers had all gone to Yale.
George Barnard’s brother Joseph was on the Supreme Court at Poughkeepsie and had a
reputation for honesty.67 George Barnard was clearly the black sheep of the family. Tales of his
cavalier, irreverent, and wildly partial behavior on the bench are legion.68
The Constitution of 1846 gave these judges ample opportunity to display their partiality.
That Constitution, responding to the pressures of an overloaded court system, had set up a
method of quasi-arbitration called referral.69 If the parties consented, their case could be heard
by a referee (essentially a special master) rather than a judge. The referee would then submit a
report to the judge who would confirm or reject it. Nominally, the fees of a referee were set at
three dollars a day. But in practice, fees could rise much higher, to fifty or a hundred dollars a
day, when a referee or his clerk did anything in a case, even adjourn it to another day.70 Fees
tended to be especially high when it was understood that relations between the judge and referee
were such that the judge would automatically confirm the referee’s report.71 As a result, there
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Kaufman notes that, in contrast with his father, Benjamin Cardozo was known for
extreme probity on the bench. KAUFMAN, supra, at 20.
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MARTIN, supra, at 76.
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See, e.g., BREEN, supra, at 158-159; T. STRONG, supra, at 72-73; Shearman, supra, at
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These were also known as “tribunals of conciliation.” 2 ALDEN CHESTER, COURTS AND
LAWYERS OF NEW YORK: A HISTORY 1609-1925, 686 (1925).
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were fortunes to be made in the referee business, and certain judges had their own stable of
referees, presumably providing kickbacks to them.
Judges Barnard and Cardozo were past masters of this practice. Shearman did not
mention Barnard by name, but was clearly describing him when said that the “reference business
had begun to assume dangerous proportions before this judge took his seat; but it was reserved
for him to give it the form of a science.”72 No matter what the circumstances, if a case was worth
enough, he sent it to one of the lawyers in his former law office. Objection was useless; even the
agreement of all the parties on other names was in vain.73 Matthew Breen describes an amusing
example of this. He noted that Judge Cardozo gave most of his valuable references to Gratz
Nathan, who was his nephew. Barnard gave his to his former law partner, James H. Coleman.
Two lawyers, one representing the plaintiff and the other the defendant in an action, agreed in
writing to refer the case to Gratz Nathan, and handed up an order of reference to Judge Barnard.
That worthy judge, when he saw the name of Gratz Nathan as referee, exclaimed: “‘Gratz
Nathan! No, gentlemen; “Jimmy” Coleman is my Gratz.’”74 Shearman said that the only limits
to Judge Barnard’s sending the spoils of referral to his favorites were the jealousy of the other
judges and repeated amendments of the law aimed at this practice. The other judges he
sometimes defied and sometimes conciliated by giving a few references to their relatives and
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BREEN, supra, at 390. Cardozo’s gift of business to his nephew was not limited to
referrals and receiverships. The lawyer George Templeton Strong, for instance, was furious after
an encounter with Judge Albert Cardozo in which Cardozo tried to force parties to a suit for
partition of real estate to accept Gratz Nathan as a “real estate expert,” to be paid $10,000 for
doing no work. 4 STRONG DIARIES, supra, at 236. See also KAUFMAN, supra, at 295.
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friends. The law he evaded in various ways, especially by letting lawyers know that it was
dangerous to object to his nominations for referee.75
The Ring judges similarly corrupted the process of appointing receivers. The
appointment of corrupt receivers was perhaps even more feared than the appointment of corrupt
referees, since large fortunes might be placed in the receivers’ hands with no one to check their
disposition of property, loans without security, and so on.76 George Templeton Strong noted the
grave consequences this could have for New York as a commercial center: “Law does not protect
property. The abused machinery of Law is a terror to property owners. . . . No city can long
continue rich and prosperous that tolerates abuses like these. Capital will flee to safer
quarters.”77 As with injunctions, the Erie Railroad litigation and the Albany & Susquehanna
75

Shearman, supra, at 159.
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Shearman, supra, at 168, 159. One of the city’s most prominent lawyers, James T.
Brady, caused a stir among the bar and politicians when he lost his temper in Judge Barnard’s
court. The episode is recounted in BREEN, supra, at 320, 394. While Brady was crossexamining a receiver appointed by Judge Barnard, the judge constantly intervened to aid the
receiver in dodging the questions. Exasperated, Brady finally turned to Barnard with raised arm
pointing directly at the judge and, “in a ringing voice, all but accused him of joint corruption
with the receiver.” Although Barnard was ordinarily flippant on the bench, he turned silent and
pale as Brady declared that “he made his statement regardless of consequences, and that in the
interest of the profession and in vindication of the court, he was not only ready to make a
personal sacrifice, but that he should appeal to all honest man and all courageous lawyers to aid
him in driving from power those who were degrading the administration of justice.” Breen
wrote that it was “the first, forward step in the fight against the corrupt Judiciary.” Id. at 320.
Brady had considerable influence within the bar, being at that time the president of the New
York Law Institute, the only functioning organization of the New York City bar. The Institute
had been founded in 1828 by James Kent, and although it mainly operated a library service, it
counted among its members most of the leaders of the city bar and could be a rallying point for
judicial reform. Unfortunately, Brady died soon after his outburst, in February 1869, and a much
less zealous reformer, Charles O’Conor, took over as head of the Institute. Some other channel
for judicial reform would have to be found.
77

4 STRONG DIARIES, supra, at 264 (Dec. 18, 1869). Strong described the problems with
receivers: “No banker or merchant is sure that some person, calling himself a ‘receiver,’
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litigation illustrated the worst abuse of the power to appoint receivers.
D.

Abuse of Criminal Justice

Tweed and his associates were hardly likely to overlook the criminal justice system in
their quest to dominate and bilk city government. A combination of political pressure and
bribery kept the judges well under control. The politically-favored, especially if they were
wealthy, had nothing to fear. Indictments against them could be prevented (by control of the
district attorney78 and/or grand jury) or quashed. Shearman reported that a man was indicted for
“a series of enormous frauds” by which he had made himself rich. A judge quashed the
indictment on a technicality, and Shearman claimed, “on the most respectable authority,” that the
judge received $10,000 for the decision. The man later openly boasted that he knew how to
manage the drawing of future grand juries to prevent any renewal of the indictment, and indeed
subsequent efforts to indict him failed.79 Those who were not so wealthy also benefitted, so long
as they were aiding the Ring. Tweed’s operatives accused of election fraud, if they were arrested
at all, were quickly sprung from jail without so much as a cursory examination of the charges
against them. Strong wrote in his diaries: “Law protects life no longer. Any scoundrel who is

appointed ex parte as the first step in some frivolous suit he never heard of, may not march into
his counting room at any moment, demand possession of all his assets and the ruinous
suspension of his whole business, and when the order for a receiver is vacated a week
afterwards, claim $100,000 or so as ‘an allowance’ for his services, by virtue of another order, to
be enforced by attachment.” Id.
78

See the debates over the corruption and political favoritism of this officer in the 186768 Convention. In 1857, Tweed arranged for his good friend Peter B. Sweeny to become District
Attorney. BREEN, supra, at 55.
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Shearman, supra, at 166. Shearman gave another example of a judge who quashed an
indictment on a technicality, and the next day a check for $500, drawn by the accused, was
cashed on Wall Street with the judge’s indorsement on it. Id. at 165-166.
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backed by a little political influence in the corner groceries of his ward can commit murder with
almost absolute impunity.”80
Should the defendant be so unlucky as to have a case come on for trial, the judge’s power
over the jury might be exerted. A good lunch and a $100 bribe might be all that was needed for
the evidence for the prosecution to become unconvincing to the judicial mind, and a verdict of
acquittal directed.81 Theron Strong, a distant relative of George Templeton Strong, recounts in
his memoirs an example, at a slightly later period, of a judge giving a politically astute summingup.82 New York judges retained the power that English and federal judges had to sum up the
evidence for the jury and to present their own views.83 Although in this instance it is unclear
whether the judge understood the summing-up to be politically astute or was just fortunate, the
story indicates the power elected judges might wield in favor of their political allies. Judge
George C. Barrett, president of the new Young Men’s Municipal Reform Organization, was
elected to the Supreme Court in 1871 after being nominated by the reforming Apollo Hall
Democrats and endorsed by the Committee of Seventy.84 Judge Barrett was a judge in the
80

4 STRONG DIARIES, supra, at 264 (Dec. 18, 1869). This was so, he said, partly because
“[t]he sheriff’s office is a den of Celtic thieves, roughs, and Sicarii.” Id.
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Throughout his memoirs, Theron Strong commented on various judges’ styles of
summing up and clearly viewed it as an important judicial attribute in New York. See, e.g., T.
STRONG, supra, at 16-17, 44, 111, 127. He seems to have thought the practice was valuable.
Interestingly, he has harsh words for what he calls the “‘settling’ judge” who tried to force the
parties into compromise, a common type today in the era of managerial judging. Id. at 130.
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As a result of a movement favored by many lawyers in the South and West, other state
judges lost this ability. See Lerner, Transformation, supra, at 225.
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His opponent was the Tammany candidate Thomas A. Ledwith, who was attacked by
the Association of the Bar. T. STRONG, supra, at 101.
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English mode favored by reformers: “His jury trials were manifestations of a high order of
judicial ability to control the progress of things, and to mould the verdict of jurors.”85 It was
“said to have been the boast of a great English judge that he never lost but one verdict,” and
Judge Barrett was similar. “He was what would be described as a verdict-getting judge.” At the
end of a trial he had well-defined views as to what the verdict should be, and he exerted his
influence to see that there was no miscarriage of justice.86 In all Judge Barrett’s years on the
bench, “[t]here were probably very few cases in which the verdict did not express his own
conviction, and in cases where it did not, he was bold and fearless in setting the verdict aside.”87
Judge Barrett presided over many important criminal trials, including the second trial of
Richard Croker for murder. At his first trial the jury hung, and at the second he was acquitted.
Judge Barrett was up for re-election in 1885, when Croker had become the boss of Tammany
Hall. It was therefore important, if not essential, for Judge Barrett to get his support. One of
Barrett’s colleagues on the bench arranged a meeting between them, and introduced Barrett to
Croker. The first thing Barrett said was, “‘Mr. Croker, I am glad to see you, I have not met you
since you were tried before me.’” His colleague was astonished at Barrett’s bluntness, until he
realized that this was his way of reminding Croker of the great service done him in presenting
the case to the jury in a manner that justified an acquittal. A tender scene ensued; within the next
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Id. Barrett was “[u]nlike most judges, who seem to drift along with a trial instead of
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five minutes judge and political boss were “enfolding each other in a loving embrace.”88 Indeed,
for a number of years after this meeting, according to Strong, few had greater influence with
Croker than Judge Barrett.89
Others, less wealthy or disfavored by the Ring, were not so lucky. Like dictatorships
everywhere, the Ring did not hesitate to use imprisonment as an intimidation tactic.
“Sometimes,” Shearman reported, “a highly respectable man will be kept in durance, at the
instance of wealthy enemies, notwithstanding he is abundantly able and willing to give bail.”90
In the Erie litigation unjustified arrests occurred that disrupted crucial shareholders’ meetings.
In the reverse situation, a poor and unconnected victim could likewise expect no justice against a
wealthy, connected guilty party.
We remember an instance in which a rich but infamous brothel-keeper had
terribly beaten one of the poor wretches in her house. The “prisoner” was on bail,
the accuser was detained as a witness. When the case was called, the poor
creature came forward, her face all clotted with blood, and her clothes torn to
rags,–a ghastly spectacle. The counsel for the accused took her aside, and, under
the very eyes of the judge, bullied and coaxed her by turns, threatening her with
prosecution as a vagrant, and with the revenge of her mistress, until she agreed
not to prosecute the case, on condition of her doctor’s bill (say five or ten dollars)
being paid. The counsel then announced to the justice that the complaint was
withdrawn. The justice shortly asked the complainant if that was so, to which the
poor creature sadly responded that she would not withdraw her complaint if she
were not so poor; but as it was, she supposed she could not help herself. The
justice harshly replied that he had nothing to do with that. The complaint was
dismissed; and the miserable woman was promptly bundled out of court by the
officers.91
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Shearman said that the reporters who attended the police courts seemed only to present
the “ludicrous side” of events happening there, “but to all who feel compassion for man as man,
these scenes have much in them to excite both pity and indignation.” Morning after morning, a
motley herd of human beings were driven in “like so many oxen, and as summarily knocked on
the head if they are in the least refractory, and violently pushed forward if their movements are
slow.”92 Called up before the justice, if poor and friendless they were often sentenced scarcely
understanding the charge against them. Others had counsel, but usually one of the infamous
“shysters” or “Tombs lawyers” well-noted by legal writers of the time.93 These operated almost
as a ring of professional thieves, expertly fleecing “clients” for all they were worth and providing
little if any service in return, sometimes even keeping money designated as the judge’s bribe for
themselves. Judges and lawyers together conspired in the last two years of the war, Shearman
alleged, to release thousands of prisoners on condition that they would enlist in the army, the
judges and lawyers then splitting the recruiting fee between them.94 Some judges made a great
show of sentencing certain defendants severely, in order to get cover for letting off more
dangerous criminals who had given bribes or employed the right lawyers.95
The scandal of criminal justice in the city was so bad that even the normally circumspect
Police Commissioners, in their Annual Report for 1865, used strong language to describe the

92

Id. at 166.

93

See, e.g., 2 BRYCE, supra, at 1302.

94

Shearman, supra, at 170-171.

95

Id. at 171.
28

situation.96 “In no other such city does the machinery of criminal justice so signally fail to
restrain or punish serious and capital offences. . . . Property is fearfully menaced by fire and
robberies; and persons are in startling peril from criminal violence.” This lamentable state of
affairs was largely due to “a tardy and inefficient administration of justice.” Unless some
remedy was found, “life in the metropolis will drift rapidly towards the condition of
barbarism.”97
Shearman himself echoed these sentiments and pleaded with the bar to overcome their
fear of exposing the corruptions of which they were aware. The better lawyers’ sense of honor
in their own affairs, he said, was as strong as ever, but the corrupt atmosphere surrounding them
had made them “almost insensible to the degradation of public men.”98 He recognized the
difficult situation in which practicing lawyers of good conscience found themselves. If they
openly defied the judges, they could not continue to practice law. If they left the bar, it would
leave the public wholly at the mercy of plunderers. The better part of the New York bar, he
wrote, desired reform.99 What to do? The opportunity had finally arrived, Shearman urged, at
the Constitutional Convention about to meet in Albany. He implored delegates to put away all
partisan concerns and to work together to secure the best men for judicial office from all parties.
“Good men of all political opinions must unite upon this single issue, or the greatest city of
America will soon fulfil the gloomy forebodings of the Police Commissioners, and sink into
96
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hopeless barbarism.”100
III.

The Elite World: Old New York and Old New England
The class to which Shearman was trying to appeal was worlds apart in terms of its social

life, culture, and politics from Tweed’s Ring and its henchmen, yet the two domains existed side
by side in the city. Amid the corrupt judges and municipal hacks wielding power over teeming
immigrant slums, the world of old New York carried on, with its revolutionary war descendants
obeying fixed social customs, paying homage to a strict code of business probity, and abdicating
political responsibility. What were the characteristics of this class, and what could galvanize
them into action against political and judicial corruption?
It has not been easy to settle on a name for this class, and that difficulty points to regional
nuances. Some historians call this group “Mugwumps,”101 but that label is not satisfactory
because it properly refers only to those who bolted the Republican party in the presidential
election of 1884, when Republicans nominated the allegedly corrupt James Blaine against the
reform-minded Democrat, Grover Cleveland. The period we are dealing with is earlier, and
although most of the people we are concerned with were Republicans, some were Democrats.
An alternative is the term used by G. Edward White, “Brahmin gentry.”102 This is better, since it
captures the almost priestly ideals and gentlemanliness of the class. But White was using it to
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describe a largely New England elite, and hearing the term one thinks immediately of “Boston
Brahmins,” rather than old New York. “Old New York” was indeed the term native New
Yorkers of this class tended to use about themselves. I will use the terms “old New York” and
“old New England.” The separate terms are, I believe, important because there were significant
differences between the native New Yorkers and the well-educated and well-bred New
Englanders who migrated to New York and made up such a large part of the elite New York bar.
Both native New Yorkers and elite New Englanders had high ideals of professional conduct and
wanted to restore the New York bench to its former glory by re-anglicizing it. But without the
reforming zeal and willingness to get into politics of the newcomers from New England, old
New Yorkers would have been considerably less effective. The infusion of New England energy
into New York professional circles enabled the elite of the bar to some extent to guide and uplift
democratic institutions in the city.
A.

Old New York

Of the two societies, old New York has been the less studied by legal historians. This is
understandable since old New York produced many fewer significant legal figures. Still, it could
breed political giants–Theodore Roosevelt being the best example–and its culture and moral
code helped to determine one of the main routes the elite bar would take to reform: a select,
gentlemanly association. One of the most thoughtful accounts of old New York society comes to
us from the best-known literary figure it produced: Edith Wharton (1862-1937). Wharton’s
account is in large part confirmed by the diaries of the older New York lawyer George
Templeton Strong (1820-1875), famous for their mordant wit and wide scope of interest.
Wharton was hardly uncritical of the society in which she grew up; she made its stultifying
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pressure the main theme of her most famous novels. But in her later years, she said she had
become “better able to measure the formative value of nearly three hundred years of social
observance: the concerted living up to long-established standards of honour and conduct, of
education and manners” that were part of the social aristocracy she was born into.103
Her account emphasizes three features important to us here: Englishness, insistence on
probity in business affairs, and political withdrawal–all of which were related. Throughout her
description, she highlights the Englishness of old New York, contrasting it with the New York
society that followed and also, interestingly, with that of Boston. The old New York families
were of both English and Dutch origin, but according to Wharton the more aristocratic English
culture predominated. During Wharton’s lifetime, theories of racial (often meaning what we
would call ethnic) and innate family differences flourished, and Wharton herself makes frequent
reference to blood and bloodlines. In her memoirs, however, bloodlines, inherited culture, and
constant recent connections with the old country are all intertwined, and seem to blend together
seamlessly into one fabric. According to Wharton, old New York families assiduously
maintained links with the English root of their culture.104 The mellow Anglicanism typical of old
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The families hired English tutors to educate both sons and daughters; Wharton’s
mother and her siblings all had English tutors, as did Wharton and her brothers, and this was
commonplace. Id. at 49. Sons of the families were also regularly sent to Oxford and Cambridge.
Id. Reverence for correct (as well as easy, flexible, and idiomatic) written and spoken English
was high, despite the lack of literary enthusiasm in this world. Id. The blending of blood and
culture is evident in Wharton’s thought on this subject, so dear to a writer: “My mother’s stock
was English, without Dutch blood, and this may account for the greater sensitiveness of all her
people to the finer shades of English speech.” Id. at 53. Her father’s people, on the other hand,
were partly Dutch and “had disagreeable voices. I have often noticed that wherever, in old New
York families, there was a strong admixture of Dutch blood, the voices were flat, the diction was
careless.” Id. at 52-53. Travel also kept members of the society linked with their roots.
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New Yorkers also contributed to the pervading English atmosphere.105
Chief among the “moral treasures”106 of the society Wharton described lay in upholding
two important standards: “that of education and good manners, and of scrupulous probity in
business and private affairs.”107 In discussing its business aspect, Wharton called her world “a
mercantile middle class” and stated that “[t]he first duty of such a class was to maintain a strict
standard of uprightness in affairs; and the gentlemen of my father’s day did maintain it, whether
in the law, in banking, shipping or wholesale commercial enterprises.”108 The punishment
Wharton remembers old New Yorkers as continually planning, embarking on, or returning from
European travel. As a result, in contrast to a typical member of Bostonian society, “[t]he old
New Yorker was in continual contact with the land of his fathers.” Id. at 61. Wharton was
surprised to discover, after her marriage to a Bostonian, how little Bostonians tended to travel
compared with New Yorkers.
105

Wharton observes that while some of the old Dutch families continued to follow the
Dutch reformed rite, “the New York of my youth was distinctly Episcopalian,” and the “noble
cadences of the Book of Common Prayer” tended to induce a “reverence for . . . ordered ritual.”
Id. at 10. In this respect, she compares orderly old New York to factious Boston and notes that
some of her English forbears settled first in Massachusetts, but were probably not “of the stripe
of religious fanatic or political reformer to breathe easily in that passionate province,” and so
transferred to New York. Id. at 9. She wonders whether “those old New Yorkers did not owe
their greater suavity and tolerance to the fact that the Church of England (so little changed under
its later name of Episcopal Church of America) provided from the first their prevalent form of
worship.” Id. George Templeton Strong certainly fit this mode, with his high-church
Anglicanism. Strong was an active Episcopalian, being a vestryman at Trinity Church, where
his fellow worshipers included John Jacob Astor and many other prominent old New Yorkers (as
well as nouveaux riches). He was perhaps unlike many old New Yorkers in being deeply
interested in theological questions, and his diaries are filled with theological essays.
106

Id. at 7.

107

Id. at 21.

108
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visited on members of the class who violated this code was swift and severe: “I well remember
the horror excited by any irregularity in affairs, and the relentless social ostracism inflicted on
the families of those who lapsed from professional or business integrity.”109 She recounted that
in a case in which two or three men of her class were involved in a discreditable bank failure,
“their families were made to suffer to a degree that would seem merciless to our modern
judgment.”110 Strong’s diaries describe an example of the ostracism inflicted on those who
strayed from professional probity in the downfall of old New York lawyer Henry Nicoll for
misappropriating clients’ money.111 Strong differed somewhat from Wharton’s account in
suggesting that while old New York certainly had a high ideal of business probity, adherence to
it was perhaps not nearly so universal as Wharton describes.
While Wharton praised the “social amenity and financial incorruptibility”112 of her world,
she viewed both, particularly the latter, as linked to a substantial failing: the refusal to engage in
politics. “Perhaps the New Yorkers of that day were unconsciously trying to atone for their
culpable neglect of state and national politics, from which they had long disdainfully held aloof,
by upholding the sternest principles of business probity, and inflicting the severest social

who, after fleeing the Terror, kept a bookstore in Philadelphia that was the haunt of the most
aristocratic of his fellow émigrés, and yet he could not be invited to Washington’s inaugural ball.
Wharton notes that “[s]o little did the [American] Revolution revolutionize a society at once
middle-class and provincial that no retail dealer, no matter how palatial his shop-front or how
tempting his millions, was received in New York society until long after I was grown up.” Id.
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penalties on whoever lapsed from them.”113 Direct political involvement was viewed as out of
the question. Even in the 1870's and 80's, “the idea that gentlemen could stoop to meddle with
politics had hardly begun to make its way, and none of my friends rendered the public services
that a more enlightened social system would have exacted of them.”114 When old New Yorker
Theodore Roosevelt began his political career, his family reacted “with almost uniform
horror.”115 Wharton took the rather European view that “[i]n every society there is the room, and
the need, for a cultivated leisure class,” and laments that this class was not used appropriately in
New York: “but from the first the spirit of our institutions has caused us to waste this class
instead of using it.”116 Wharton expresses amazement that the descendants of men who had
fought for their freedom and been so heavily involved in the founding of a nation now seemed to
possess “a blind dread of innovation, an instinctive shrinking from responsibility.”117 Of course,
the massive immigration into New York City of people who were hardly inclined to respect the
birthright or virtues of Wharton’s class must have caused old New Yorkers to shrink from
participating in elective politics. Wharton does note that, probably sometime in the 1870's or
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80's, old New Yorkers had begun to shake off the apathy that had fallen on them after the Civil
War, and started to be active in the affairs of the city once again. But this activity took the form
of participation in privately-funded causes, such as museums, libraries, and charities.118 The
founding in 1870 of the private and select Association of the Bar of the city of New York, as
opposed to a more public body, was symptomatic of this tendency.119 Such institutions allowed
New Yorkers to become involved without dealing directly with Ring bosses or the less
scrupulous elements of the bar.
In old New York society, the profession of law held a unique place. Of the “liberal
professions”–which Wharton did not define but which in England meant physicians, clergy, and
barristers–it was the most common.120 As in England, some knowledge of the law was
considered appropriate for young gentlemen, and in fact, almost all the young men Wharton
knew studied law for a while after leaving college, though comparatively few practiced it later.121
A few old New Yorkers were indeed “distinguished lawyers,” with “busy professional
careers.”122 Many of these more serious practitioners were graduates of Columbia College or
Columbia Law School, as was Strong.123
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But while the law might be a thoroughly respectable profession, it could be problematic
from a moral point of view. Even a “distinguished lawyer” was bound to represent the interests
of his clients, and such a distinguished lawyer was likely to have for clients men who were
immersed in “feverish money-making, in Wall Street or in railway, shipping or industrial
enterprises,” or, as Wharton more succinctly puts it, “gold-fever.”124 These lawyers were
directly in contact with the nouveaux riches whose obsession with money-making and
unscrupulous business methods were anathema to old New York. The lawyers were one of the
relatively few points of contact between the world Wharton describes and that of rough-andtumble city business and politics.125 On the one hand, such lawyers were in a good position to
know something about government affairs and thus to be reformers; on the other, as Shearman
student. He is frequently accused of prejudice against various ethnic groups, and while that
cannot be denied, he was more open-minded than many believe. Regarding allegations that he
was anti-Irish or anti-Semitic, see his concern over the Irish potato famine, his praise for pianist
Anton Rubinstein, he and his wife’s entertaining Miss Sarah Lazarus in their box at the opera,
and their visit to the new 5th Avenue Reform synagogue, with favorable comments (though he
could not resist a crack about “porkophagous, or porcivorous” Jews). 4 STRONG DIARIES, supra,
at 262-262.
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In Wharton’s novels, the infusion of the nouveaux riches is portrayed as doing both
moral and aesthetic damage to the older organic society. In The Custom of the Country, an old
New Yorker considers the influx of new money:
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feared, their professional interests and the old New York social world discouraged getting
involved.
B.

New Englanders and the Elite New York Bar

New England-born lawyers provided the jolt that galvanized the elite New York bar into
action. As Wharton suggests in her description of the differences between Bostonians and old
New Yorkers, New Englanders tended to have more reforming zeal and political ardor, whereas
New Yorkers preferred to emphasize private gentlemanly social life and institutions. A native of
New England, William Evarts, was one of the strongest voices at the New York Convention of
1867 in favor of reforming the judiciary. Nearly every one of the members of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York who were most in favor of taking on the Ring directly and
reforming the system of judicial selection were of New England origin. These included Evarts,
Dorman Eaton, and James Coolidge Carter.126 Old New Yorkers, in contrast, tended to
concentrate on heightening standards of admission to the bar, as well as maintaining a suitable
clubhouse and library for the gentlemanly portion of the bar.
These New Englanders tended to come from families who were well-to-do, if not
necessarily wealthy, and socially prominent, with a tradition of local leadership.127 Many had
close links with Congregationalist churches, and embraced a strict, although rather dry, moral
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code whose major tenet was avoiding “selfishness, greed, and licentious behavior.”128 This code
was dry in more ways than one; Carter, for example, condemned saloons, “where men are
tempted to ruin themselves and their families by indulgence in drink and are led into the
commission of the worst of crimes.”129 These men were well-educated, most at Harvard and
Yale, and they viewed themselves as a sort of natural aristocracy. They deplored both the
money-grubbing nouveaux riches and “the unthinking and vicious multitudes who crowd our
cities.”130 They tended to be anti-slavery and Republican following the Civil War, though not
deeply attached to either party. As the revolt of many of them against the Republican Blaine in
1884 demonstrates, they were ready to support any candidate who credibly promised reform.
As lawyers, however, these men were faced with special dilemmas. Many of them, such
as Willliam Evarts, 131 came to New York and were highly successful at the bar, some becoming
millionaires in the process. Their success depended on representing clients, including Cornelius
Vanderbilt, Jim Fisk, and even Tweed himself, whose business practices were less than above
board. Sometimes their own tactics in representing these clients would not bear scrutiny. Even
the high-minded reformer Dorman Eaton, a classic example of the type we are discussing, in
128
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letters to his law partner revealed that he well understood the subtle art of bribing a judge.132 A
more prominent example of the reforming lawyer who used unscrupulous tactics in representing
unscrupulous clients was David Dudley Field, author of the Field Code. He was constantly
vilified by his fellow members of the elite New York bar for his actions in representing Jim Fisk
and others, but in fact his actions may have been different in degree but not in kind from his
colleagues.133 Field embodied the fascinating trait, shared by this class generally, of being able
to consider the needs of the law and law reform separately from the interests of their clients. It
was this characteristic that allowed Field to use a procedural maneuver to advantage his client,
then almost the next day propose a memorial to the legislature urging reform to close off that
maneuver. This characteristic permitted these lawyers, especially once banded together into the
Association of the Bar, to be an effective force for reform.
IV.

Post-Civil War Efforts at Reform
A.

The Constitutional Convention of 1867

As Shearman pointed out, the elite of the New York bar had a golden opportunity to
secure judicial reform at the constitutional convention of 1867. Many members of the elite bar
were represented, often elected at-large. These included both old New Yorkers, such as Joshua
Van Cott, and native New Englanders, such as Evarts. Shearman’s article had fired the
proponents of reform. At the 1867 convention in New York, many delegates made clear their
opinion that the reforms of the populist Constitution of 1846 had failed miserably. Populist
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Democrats were present and vocal, but outnumbered. Many delegates–both Republicans and
Democrats–expressed their desire to return to a more English version of the judiciary. While
compromise was necessary, in the end they succeeded in winning substantial change to present
to the voters for ratification. Interestingly, delegates were not so much concerned with the
method of selecting judges, but cared greatly about tenure.
Through a series of fortunate circumstances, members of the elite bar were able to
participate directly in shaping reform at the convention of 1867. The Constitution of 1846, in a
Jeffersonian spirit in keeping with the populist times, had provided that every twenty years the
question whether to hold another constitutional convention was to be submitted to the people of
the state.134 This populist provision had the effect of facilitating a conservative reaction in less
populist times. The question whether to hold a convention was submitted at the general election
of 1866, and the electorate voted in favor, 352,854 to 256,364. The New York legislature
provided for election of 128 delegates from the various senatorial districts and 32 delegates at
large. (No elector could vote for more than 16 at-large delegates, so the principle of minority
representation was included in the voting, which doubtless helped members of the elite bar get
elected.135) The at-large delegates were divided evenly between the parties, with 16 Democrats
and 16 Republicans. The Republicans won a majority of the districts, and so were able to elect
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the president of the convention and to some extent to control its committees.136 The convention
began in June 1867, and finished its work in February 1868. Partisan feeling ran very high at the
time the convention sat, as President Andrew Johnson and the U.S. Congress were locked in
battle. The U.S. presidential election would soon be at hand, and party leaders felt it was a tossup and were jockeying for position. Some delegates thought the close match in strength between
the parties in New York made this “an auspicious moment for us to make a Constitution,” since
no one party could look forward to controlling political offices in the state and therefore all had
incentive to design the best system possible.137 Whatever the reason, it is remarkable how
thorough and serious the debates at the New York convention were, compared with modern
political debate. Fortunately for historians, we have available five thick volumes of verbatim
debates.
Although the debates covered a wide range of fascinating topics,138 much of the
convention’s effort focused on the judiciary. As in all previous New York conventions, lawyers
formed a large majority of the delegates. Many of the most prominent lawyers (and judges) in
the state were members, including William Evarts, Charles Daly, and Joshua Van Cott. Given
the composition of the convention, it is perhaps not surprising that the judiciary article took up
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so much of the convention’s time. But many delegates seemed genuinely to believe the people
had called the convention primarily in order to rescue the judiciary from ill-advised Jacksonian
reforms. Evarts declared, “I think I see unmistakable signs of the public will showing itself by
insisting upon a change in the policy of conferring [judicial] office in the future.”139 He believed
that “any one who supposes that the people of this State do not expect from this Convention a
very thorough and substantial reinstallment of the judiciary, both in the tenure of the judges and
in their repute with the people, is mistaken.”140 Matthew Hale stated that he agreed with many
previous speakers that reform of the judiciary “is a question of greater practical importance than
any other that will come before this Convention.” In his opinion, “the evils and defects in our
present judicial system were the occasion of the calling of this Convention.”141
There was remarkable uniformity of opinion among the delegates, Republicans and
Democrats alike, about the source of the New York judiciary’s problems. Nearly all blamed the
system of elected judges for short terms inaugurated by the Constitution of 1846. Supporters of
that system were out-gunned numerically and intellectually by reformers. Several months into
the debate, William Evarts was able justly to declare, “I believe that the debate, as hitherto
conducted, shows a remarkable unanimity of opinion as to what the public interests require from
139

1867-68 DEBATES, at 2369 (remarks of William Evarts).
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Id. at 2370. “Nothing,” he said, “will disappoint the people of this State so much as
that we should adjourn, offering them a judicial arrangement which shows only circumstantial
changes in the working system, without probing and correcting the real defects in the present
judiciary, which cause such serious public concern.” Id. Evarts went on to attribute a
conservative (and rather English) attitude to the people: “They wish to see the judiciary as it
stood before them in the past, clothed with all the majesty of justice, and endued with all the
strength that it is in the power of men to place about those whom they desire to honor, and whom
they are willing to intrust with final authority.” Id.
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Id. at 2181 (remarks of Matthew Hale).
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the judiciary, in its establishment and constitution”–a unanimity, he added, that was in accord
with popular sentiment.142
The prevailing feeling was that the past glories of the New York judiciary–the days of
Chancellor Kent and Ambrose Spencer–were dimmed.143 The Convention of 1846 had foolishly
and unthinkingly done away with the conditions for that glory.144 Several delegates complained
that New York decisions were no longer followed in the rest of the country, and abroad, as they
once were. It was necessary to restore a more English conception of the judiciary, along the
lines of the New York past and of the federal bench. As Evarts put it, “The nation from which
we derive our origin, our laws, our custom, our habits, our language, has tried to put the judges,
and we have [in the past], confessedly, tried to put the judges, upon a certain footing of
superiority to the rest of the community.”145 Rotation in office must be stopped.146 Permanency
and independence were the watchwords.
Certain delegates held an especially exalted view of the judiciary, which touched on
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1867-68 DEBATES, at 2367 (remarks of William Evarts).
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Id. at 2182 (remarks of Hale).
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Id. at 2365 (remarks of Daly). See also id. at 2182 (remarks of Hale) (“If there ever
was a system devised by human wit to get a political man on the bench, the least man, the least
revered in his character, the least impartial, the most under influences which ought never to
affect the mind of a judge, that system is devised and is to be found embodied in the system of
1846.”) See also Dorman B. Eaton, Article on Judiciary, 2 LALOR’S CYCLOPAEDIA 644.
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1867-68 DEBATES, at 2367-68 (remarks of Evarts). See also remarks of A.J. Parker:
United States judges were very courteous, and “I believe you will find no judges in the world
more courteous than they are in the English courts, where they hold for life, and remain as
independent in every respect as it is possible to make them.” Id. at 2224.
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Id. at 2173 (Parker); id. at 2179, 2193 (Rathbun); id. at 2188 (Van Cott); id. at 2362
(Daly). A few populists delegates spoke in favor of rotation. Id. at 2200 (McDonald).
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questions of jurisprudence. Two of the most prominent lawyers at the convention, the
Republicans Joshua Van Cott and William Evarts, expressed similar conceptions. The judge in
their view must be utterly above politics, serene in his lofty sphere almost like a heavenly body
(or like God). Van Cott declared that “the function of the judge has no relation to policy
whatever.”147 The legislature “determines the policy of the State . . . so far as it can be regulated
by statute.” It “prescribes the policy with absolute force, so far as it can be prescribed and fixed
by mere legislation.” The executive’s function “is merely to see that the laws are faithfully
administered.” But the judge’s function does not depend on anyone’s will, either the judge’s
own or the will of the people. “But when you come to the bench, to the solemn functions of
justice, what has the will of the people to do there? The will of the people withdraws at once.”
The judge is on a purer, loftier plane: “The court sits there, beyond the region of will, serene, to
look at the law; to see, not the parties but the question before it; to determine upon the great
principles of justice; defying will, defying popular sentiment, defying influences which would
disturb it in the faithful administration of a pure and impartial justice.” Van Cott suggested that
part of the function of this God-like judge was to protect individual liberties from the
depredations of the politicized legislature. Almost like God in heaven, the court “sits there in
that serener region to interpret and proclaim the law, and to protect the citizen in his person and
in his property.”148
Evarts likewise was at pains to separate the judge from the idea of will. “The judge is not
to declare the will of the sovereignty, whether that sovereignty reside in a crowned king, in an
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Id. at 2188 (Van Cott).
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aristocracy, or in the unnumbered and unnamed mass of the people.”149 (He hardly made the last
prospect sound attractive.) Rather, “the judiciary is the representative of the JUSTICE of the state,
and not of its POWER.” Evarts made much of the word justice, without being terribly precise
about its meaning.150 Like Van Cott, therefore, Evarts believed in a strict separation of the
functions of legislature and judiciary: “judges are to declare the law, and not impose it. . . . It is
the law of the land that they are to declare, and not the will of any power in the land, and it is a
declaration, and not an enactment of law, that is looked for from them.”151 A judge should thus
“hold his office during the pleasure of no representative of power” except “God, the Judge of
all.”152
As it was, New York judges certainly did depend on the pleasure of those in power for
their continuation in office and hardly occupied a serene sphere. Lurking in the background of
the debates at the convention were the charges of judicial corruption made in the anonymous
North American Review article. One of the most prominent members of the convention, Judge
Charles P. Daly, reluctantly brought them out in the open. Daly was a Democrat and an elected
judge of the Court of Common Pleas in New York City; he therefore had reason to know
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Id. at 2367 (Evarts).
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“Justice,” Evarts said, “is of universal import, of universal necessity, under whatever
form of government. Mr. Burke has wisely said justice is ‘the main policy of all human
society.’” Id. In their admiration for Burke (and in much else), these reformers were the
intellectual heirs of the Whigs. See D. HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN
WHIGS, 70-75, 235-36 (1979).
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1867-68 DEBATES, at 2367 (Evarts).
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Id. at 2368. Breen had similar exalted views of the role of the judge: “The functions of
a Judge approach more nearly our conception of Divine Justice than those of any other position
on earth. To basely betray that trust is an act bordering on sacrilege.” BREEN, supra, at 24.
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whereof he spoke. Respected and upright Judge Daly made a fitting counterpart to the corrupt
Judge McCunn; both were Irish-born Catholics and had served as common sailors before
immigrating to New York.153 Daly compared the situation of the New York judges after 1846 to
that of English judges in the seventeenth century, when they served at the pleasure of the king
and were renowned for caving to royal pressure.154 One of the Jacksonian populists at the
Convention, Judge Ezra Graves, was clearly uncomfortable with the implied charges of judicial
corruption made by Daly and other delegates, and asked Daly directly whether he knew of any
judge after 1846 being bribed. Daly declared he had wanted to avoid speaking about it, but
referred to the article in the North American Review, “containing a detailed statement of corrupt
acts and of conduct upon the bench, which is quite equal to any thing found in the dark and
disgraceful period of English judicial history.”155 He feared the New York judiciary had become
a similar byword for infamy: “Whether true or not, it is humiliating enough to know that [the
article] has gone forth to be read throughout the United States and in other lands in the leading
review of this country. That it has thereby become incorporated into the literature of the country
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Daly was something of an intellectual. He served as president of both the Friendly
Sons of St. Patrick and of the American Geographical Society. (His interest in geography
doubtless was encouraged by his early life as a common sailor.) He was immensely respected
and indeed loved by Republicans and Democrats alike. There is a wonderful portrait of him in
JAMES W. BROOKS, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF
NEW YORK 77-82 (1896). Interestingly, he wrote extensively on the history of the Jews in New
York. He also appears to have been something of an Anglophile. Theron Strong makes amusing
comments about Daly’s attempts to imitate English judges on the bench. See T. STRONG, supra,
at 133-137.
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. . . .”156 Graves pressed him as to whether he had personal knowledge of the corruption alleged.
Daly denied it, but continued to stress the ignominy of the bench: “I am humiliated when one of
the popular preachers of this country, Henry Ward Beecher, rises in his pulpit and makes the
corruption of the judiciary of the city of New York the subject of one of his most stinging
sermons, and refers to the whole body of the judiciary of the city as corrupt and rotten.”157 He
tried to secure the support of those from country districts, warning ominously that if there was
any foundation for the charges of corruption in city judges, that corruption “is not or it will not
be confined to that city. It will spread as every contagion spreads, for it will not be limited to
any one spot or place.”158 Evarts took up the theme from Daly, stressing the low repute of the
judiciary as illustrated by Daly’s response to Graves.159 In response to Evarts, another populist,
John Schumaker, defended the judiciary and attacked the North American Review article in
hyperbolic terms, calling it a “a vile, libelous article, a lampooning, anonymous, scurrilous
article,” “one of the most monstrous libels, one of the most monstrous, venomous articles that
ever emanated from any press in the country.” Significantly, he said authorship of the article “is
charged to an English spy” or, alternatively, “to an English chance-man, a ticket-of-leave
man.”160
What precisely did the delegates think were the problems caused by election of judges for
156

Id.
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Id. at 2366.
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Id. See also id. at 2406-07.
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Id. at 2371 (Evarts).
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Id. at 2372 (remarks of John G. Schumaker). See also mention of corrupt referees, id.
at 2413; references to Judges Cardozo and Barnard, id. at 2419.
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short terms? Delegates were not much concerned about partisanship in the initial selection of
judges. They were far more concerned about the influence party operatives wielded after a judge
went on the bench.161 Daly praised the determination of the constitution of 1821 to remove the
judges from partisan politics, and the nationally-acknowledged superiority of the resulting
judges.162 But the situation had changed radically after 1846. A judge elected for a short term
must give up his business and becomes dependent upon his office for support. Continuance in
office was vital, since judicial salaries were so small that a judge could save nothing to provide a
cushion once he left the bench.163 Such a judge “soon learns that his continuance in office does
not depend upon his learning, his ability or his integrity.” It depends, first, upon the continuance
in power of the political party that elected him; and, secondly, upon his ability to secure a
renomination at the end of his short judicial term. “He may have the learning of Mansfield and
the integrity of Hale, but it will avail him little if his party is not in power, and if he is not an
active, leading and influential member of it.”164 Judges thus threw themselves into politics.165
161

“The real evil at present is that, after he goes upon the bench, he depends for his
continuance there upon the action and upon all the influences which affect political parties.” Id.
at 2365 (Daly).
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“From 1821 to 1846, [New York judges] were beyond even the charge of political
partisanship. They neither mixed in nor took part any prominent part in the strife of parties
while they sat upon the bench.” Id. at 2365. As a result, “during the tenure of good behavior,
the judiciary of the State of New York, in the character of its judges, and in the weight attached
to their decisions, held a rank among the very first, if it was not the first, in the Union.” Id.
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Id. at 2365.
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Id.
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Daly noted that “within the last six or seven years, the name of almost every judge in
the city of New York has been heralded in the newspapers as president or vice-president of some
political meeting, not from their own choice in all cases, but because the exigencies of party
demanded it.” Id. at 2359.
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Because of partisan influence and the poor organization of the courts created by the Constitution
of 1846, the prestige and influence of New York’s judiciary had plummeted.166
Going out on a limb, Judge Daly illustrated the truth of these principles with specific
examples.167 Daly preferred, for reasons of tact, to stress the loss of good men from the bench
than the gain of bad ones. “My late colleague, Judge Woodruff, in learning, ability and integrity,
would compare with any judge that we have had upon the bench in this State. He was a
republican, and when his term was at an end, he could not be, and he was not, re-elected.”168
Another example demonstrated the problem of intra-party squabbles: “Chief Justice Bosworth
adorned the bench of the superior court, and gave to American jurisprudence the valuable series
of reports which bear his name. He was a democrat, and his party was in power, but he did not
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Id. Professor Dwight reportedly said in a meeting of the judiciary committee that
students at law schools outside New York no longer bought Barbour’s reports, containing the
decisions of the New York Supreme Court, since judges from other states attached so little
weight to them. Id. at 2362. See also id. at 2220 (remarks of Smith) (“[B]efore this new system
[of the Constitution of 1846] came into vogue, there was no State in the Union whose reports
stood higher in all the sister States, in England, and wherever they were cited, than the State of
New York; and I am also aware that since the change was made and our present system adopted,
our reports have greatly fallen in the estimation of our sister States and of foreign tribunals.”)
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Delegates were willing to talk in general terms about the problems, but were often very
reticent in naming names or specific instances. This is quite understandable in a convention
composed mainly of practicing lawyers and sitting judges; they did not want to offend particular
judges, for fear of losing clients or insulting colleagues. Almost as soon as a particular name
escaped their lips, they were apologizing. Id. at 2373 (Daly apologizing for casting aspersions
on Judge McCunn). Nevertheless, it was clear that they had specific judges and instances in
mind.
168

Id. Matthew Hale also pointed to the defeat of Judges Alexander H. Johnson and
George F. Comstock as examples of good judges defeated at the polls. Id. at 2382 (remarks of
Matthew Hale). Even one of Comstock’s political opponents said he was “sorry that his judicial
abilities were lost to the state.” Id. at 2382 (remarks of M.I. Townsend).
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secure the necessary nomination and was not re-elected.”169 Evarts was more direct than Daly
about the reasons for failing to renominate Bosworth: “When Chief Justice Bosworth made
certain decisions against a great political character [Tweed], that great political character’s
memory lasted till the recurring election brought round the nomination in his own party. Chief
Justice Bosworth was succeeded by Judge McCunn, because such was the royal pleasure of that
political character.”170 As Evarts’s mention of Judge McCunn suggested, the problem was not
only that good men were being driven out of the New York judiciary, but that bad ones were
taking their place.
Many delegates therefore wanted a solution that would put judges beyond the power of
the political parties once they went on the bench but that would also be acceptable to the people.
The delegates for the most part were not concerned to return to an appointed judiciary; they
showed little interest in the question of initial selection by appointment or election. They agreed
with Judge Daly that “[i]t is not, in my judgment, very material how the judge is chosen, whether
by election or appointment.”171 A majority of the Judiciary Committee of the Convention,
composed of some of the most eminent (and most Anglophilic) lawyers and judges in the state,172
proposed that the judges of the Court of Appeals and of the Supreme Court be elected, with

169

Id. at 2365

170

Id. at 2368 (Evarts). Twenty-one of 28 judges were re-elected, one delegate remarked.
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Id. at 2365 (Daly). Daly was assuming the judge was to serve until seventy, and that
care would be taken in his selection.
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Charles Folger, William Evarts, Joseph Masten, George Barker, Joshua Van Cott,
Charles Daly, W. Hutchins, F. Kernan, Theodore Dwight, Amasa Parker, Charles Andrews,
Edwards Pierrepont, and Matthew Hale. Id. at 1306.
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tenure during good behavior until age seventy.173 Even the most outspoken advocates for an
appointed judiciary conceded that a system of life tenure resolved most of the problems with the
system under the Constitution of 1846. Matthew Hale stated, “I believe, . . . and I am willing to
state my belief frankly, although it may be an unpopular opinion in this Convention, that the
great error which lay at the bottom of the judicial system adopted in 1846, was in making judges
elective.”174 However, when pressed “whether he thinks that a man who is appointed by the
central power, perhaps at the dictation of a clique of political wire-pullers, would be less likely
to be influenced by partisan motives than a man elected by the people,”175 he admitted, “I do not
think there would be any difference in that respect. The life tenure provision would correct the
evil which the gentleman indicates, whether judges were elected or appointed.”176 Others stated
they favored an appointive system but doubted whether the people would ratify it.177 The
combination of belief that election with life tenure or a long term was not so much worse than
173

Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, §§ 2, 16, at id. 1306, 1308.
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Id. at 2182 (Hale).

175

Id. at 2183 (Smith).
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Id. at 2183 (Hale). Hale went on to explain that he favored appointment by the
governor because the governor would be in a better position to know of the “capacity and fitness
of the candidates” than the people, “who would simply indorse a nomination made by a political
convention.” Id. at 2183. See also remarks of Joshua Van Cott (“My own preference is for the
system of appointment, but I admit freely that the vice of the elective system, as it has existed
under the Constitution of 1846, is not so much, if at all, in the method of selection as it is in the
method of utterly destroying the independence of the judge after you have selected him.”), id. at
2188.
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Id. at 2196 (remarks of Beckwith) (“For one, I would like to see all the judges
appointed by the Governor, with the consent of the Senate; but I doubt whether the people would
be satisfied to have that plan adopted.”) Id. at 2395 (remarks of Chesebro) (stating that he
disapproved of judicial elections, “but it has since become the settled rule, and I am satisfied the
people will not now go back on it”).
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appointment, and the risk that the people would reject appointment meant that few delegates
wished to force the issue.
The exception to the desire to avoid the question of appointment was, interestingly, in the
discussions of the office of chief justice. The debate on this topic sharpened the divisions
between those who favored a more aristocratic, hierarchical, English-style judiciary and those
who wanted a populist, egalitarian, homespun bench. The Constitution of 1846 provided that the
office of chief judge of the Court of Appeals would rotate every two years. As with other issues
at the 1867-68 convention, many delegates favored more permanency. The judiciary committee
in its report had proposed that seven judges would be elected to the Court of Appeals, and that
these judges would in turn select a chief justice, who would serve out his term in that capacity.178
An amendment was proposed to make the chief justice appointed by the governor. The delegate
who proposed the amendment argued that strong leadership was necessary in all deliberative
bodies, and that by singling out the office of chief justice, “we will give dignity to that position,
as has been given to the supreme court of the United States by Chief Justice Marshall, and to the
highest court of our own state, by Chief Justice Kent.”179 Although he believed the governor
would be in the best position to choose the chief justice, since that official was acquainted with
the leading members of the profession throughout the state, he thought election to the office was
acceptable so long as the candidate was elected specifically to be chief justice.180 In his opinion,
increasing the dignity of the court’s presiding officer would reflect on the court and “will add
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much to the confidence people have in their decisions.”181 Another delegate argued for
appointing the chief justice, “and thus do here as they do in England, and have done there with
splendid success, in the selection of a long line of famous chief justices.”182
These laudatory references to federalist judges and English judges were bound to raise
the hackles of populists. One claimed that to appoint the chief justice when other offices were
elected “renders our system inharmonious, incongruous”: “the desire seems to be to yield to that
sentiment which seeks to ingraft into our republican institutions remnants and fragments of
monarchical institutions.”183 He scoffed at the desire to give the office dignity. He mocked the
justices of the U.S. Supreme Court for their English-style silk gowns, and declared that
it would be quite a proper amendment to make to this proposition here, that our
chief justice of the court of appeals should be appointed by the Governor and
Senate, that he should be furnished with a silk robe, a silver-gray wig, a goldheaded cane, and a three-cornered cocked hat, with gold band and tassels! Then
you would have dignity! [Laughter.] Then the whole people of this State could
look up to this great figure-head of justice and admire his dignity and the
exaltation of his position. Dignity! What we want is brains and business
capacity, for every-day hard work.184
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Id.
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Id. at 2188 (remarks of Van Cott). Smith, ever the pragmatist, declared he was voting
for the measure as a compromise, to satisfy those members of the electorate who thought judges
should be entirely appointed. Id. at 2192 (remarks of Smith). Interestingly, Evarts essentially
agreed with him on that point. Id. at 2367 (remarks of Evarts).
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Id. The question of judges wearing gowns was highly charged with symbolism. Those
who desired to re-Anglicize the bench were strongly in favor of gowns; populists were opposed.
Theron Strong (a Republican who had been elected a judge) has interesting discussions of both
sentiments. He says the Court of Appeals began wearing gowns in 1844, in “a reaction from the
simplicity of our forefathers,” and that the practice “gave to the judges a distinguishing mark, so
far as dress is concerned, which was very much needed. There is no question that it added tone
and dignity to the court.” T. STRONG, supra, at 39. Their precedent was the justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court. The other state courts, and the federal courts in New York as well, eventually
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While the traditionalists at the convention strove to clothe the bench with dignity in Burkean
fashion, the populists aimed to tear away that “decent drapery.” On an initial vote, the
convention voted in favor of appointment of the chief justice.185 An amendment was later
introduced providing for the election by the people of the chief justice as such, which carried.186
The point was still made, although in a weaker form, that the chief justice was to be marked out
from his colleagues for greater prestige, and the office not subject to rotation.
With no delegates willing to argue that an appointive method should be adopted by the
Convention with respect to any office but that of chief justice, debate centered on tenure and
eligibility for re-election. Although some of the more populist delegates argued otherwise, there
was a broad consensus among delegates that a term of eight years was too short.187 The terms
“permanence” and “independence” occur over and over in the debates on this topic. The
majority report of the Committee on the Judiciary called for judges elected for tenure during
good behavior until seventy years of age.188 A substitute was offered calling for terms of 14
years.189 Proponents of the fourteen-year term argued that if a poor judge is elected for life,

followed the Court of Appeals. Id. Some of the more populist judges, however, were
uncomfortable in gowns. Id at 122 (“From all indications, probably no one was ever so
uncomfortable in a gown as Judge [David] McAdam.”).
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Id. at 2188 (remarks of Joshua Van Cott) (“Now, it is agreed on all hands–for it seems
to have met with the common consent of the Convention–that a longer term of office than eight
years should be fixed for the court of last resort.”)
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Id. at 2165.
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“there is no escaping from him unless he be found guilty of some overt act.”190 They also
claimed that life tenure tends “to make the incumbent lazy, to use a plain Saxon term.”191 Some
said life-tenured judges would become “overbearing and tyrannical,” and feared particularly that
they would make their power felt over members of the bar: “the time has gone by when the
people or the bar will bow down, as they have been compelled to do in former times, to men who
happen to hold a seat on the bench.”192 Others, less inclined to populism, noted an incongruity
between elected judges and life tenure.193 They also suggested that 14-year terms were
equivalent to life tenure in many cases, given the likely average length of tenure on the bench.194
Many delegates believed that a term of fourteen years might be acceptable, but only if the judges
were ineligible for re-election.195
Despite these arguments, supporters of life tenure passionately argued their cause,
repeatedly referring to the English tradition. Judge Daly gave an elaborate description of the
depths to which English judges sank in the seventeenth century when they served at the pleasure
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Id. at 2176 (remarks of Harris) (“The public may not know when judges are to be
elected, or how many there may be to elect at any one election. I very much prefer, therefore,
that if we are to elect judges, that their term of office be a certain number of years.”).
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“I would place the judges in a position where they cannot be biased by any partisan
influence or popular favor, and, above all, where they shall not be suspected of having their
opinions influenced at all by public opinion upon either side. That can only be done by
depriving them of the opportunity for re-election.” Id. at 2173 (remarks of A.J. Parker).
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of the king, followed by glowing praise of those serving with life tenure.196 The latter, he said,
have all “been men of character, most of whom have adorned the seat of justice by their talents,
their acquirements and their virtues.”197 Van Cott, Evarts, and others also made ardent pleas
depicting the plight of a younger man, elected at 40, whose term would end at age 54 and who
would then be compelled to resume private practice with his former clients gone and diminished
capacity for getting new ones.198 Besides being undignified and an affront to the profession, this
prospect would deter many able lawyers from joining the bench.199 In addition a man in such a
position, they said, would be tempted while still on the bench to curry favor with those who
could help him when he left it, as in the parable of the unjust steward.200 If judicial salaries were
higher, the situation would be different: “Now, I can understand, if we gave our judges the
splendid salaries which are paid to judges in England, a prudent man in fourteen years would
save a handsome competency and retire from the bench without any of the oppressive anxieties
to which I have referred.”201 However, given New York’s track record, judicial salaries were
likely to remain a “pittance.”202
Evarts conceded that the proposal of a 14-year term, with ineligibility for re-election,

196

Id. at 2363-2364 (remarks of Daly).

197

Id. at 2364.

198

Id. at 2189 (remarks of Van Cott); 2369 (remarks of Evarts).

199

Id. at 2185 (remarks of Conger).

200

Id. at 2199 (remarks of Hale).

201

Id. at 2189 (remarks of Van Cott).

202

Id.
57

contained “a great many elements of usefulness,” still it “falls short of a practical application of
the true principle of the judicial tenure.”203 Evarts described what is was “to take a lawyer and
make a judge of him” almost as if it were the ordination of a priest: it was to “consecrate him,
sacrifice him, to some extent, for the public service.”204 Judges were therefore deserving of the
highest honor the state could give. It was important that the bar, in itself an honorable
profession,205 feel the special honor of the judge, feel the separateness of the judge.
Let us have the reflex of an independent judiciary upon an independent bar. Let
us work together. Let us magnify the judicial office for the public good. Let us
be servants of the court as we are servants of the law, but only in that sense. Let
us have no motives for drawing comparisons between the bench and the bar,
preparing for future candidacy, for our own interests. Let us see to it that in the
administration of justice, private interests and by-ends are excluded. Let us all
know and understand, when a vacancy on the bench occurs, that it is a great
matter who shall be judge. Let the power, Governor or the people, which fills the
place, understand that it is for a durable tenure, and that a whole generation is to
sit under the shade of that authority which is raised over them.206
(Note the contrast between this desire for the separateness of the bench and the criticism of that
separateness among the populists.) Smith tried to bring the debate down to earth by asking of
delegates in different parts of the state whether they thought the people would be prepared to
ratify a constitution proposing life tenure. He thought not, and argued that “[w]e should aim not
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only to make a good Constitution, but one that the people will adopt.”207 Evarts was at his most
high-minded in his response, proclaiming that the duty of the delegates was to frame a
constitution that they thought best, not second-best, let the results of the ballot-box be what they
may.208 Smith countered that the problem was not one of morality but of policy, and if the
people “will not adopt what we might regard as the best possible, we must give them the best
they will adopt.”209 In the end, sufficient delegates were convinced either of the superiority of a
14-year term in itself or of the people’s willingness to reject life tenure. The 14-year term
prevailed for judges of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, and judges were to be
eligible for re-election.
Although they were not willing to stick their necks out by calling directly for an
appointive judiciary, members of the Judiciary Committee believed strongly enough in an
appointive system that their report provided for a referendum on whether to return to an
appointive system at the general election of 1870.210 The Convention voted to change the date to
1873, to allow voters to get some experience under the new Constitution before making this
choice.211 The section was regarded as a concession to those delegates who believed judges
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should be selected by appointment.212 Not surprisingly, several populist Democrats objected to
the provision, calling it “very unusual” and arguing that any such change should be made by the
normal process of constitutional amendment.213 Supporters of appointment in effect charged
these objectors with hypocrisy, claiming that it was inconsistent in the self-proclaimed
champions of the people to oppose a popular referendum.214 A motion to strike the section was
narrowly defeated.215 Thus a battle was predetermined for a date four years away.
In the meantime, there was vote-getting work to be done to encourage the people to ratify
the changes made by the 1867-68 convention at the election in November 1869. The bar
statewide labored hard for the passage of the judiciary article. Less than two years later the
Albany Law Journal praised the bar’s strenuous efforts on behalf of the proposal: “Of all the
work of the late convention submitted to the people, this article, standing alone, would find the
least favor with politicians or with the people. Yet the bar, as a whole, supported it, and it was
carried in spite of the active efforts of politicians of both parties, and when all the rest of the
proposed amendments were rejected.”216 The judiciary article was submitted separately from the
rest of the work of the convention. It was in fact the only article proposed by the convention of
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One delegate said that, in submitting the question to a referendum, “[t]he very will of
the people is to be reached. Yet there stands the advocate of the people, who is in favor of
submitting every thing to the people and of being in all respects governed by their opinion, their
will, and their wish, and yet it seems he will set up his ‘I’ against them and their wish, if they do
not agree with him.” Id. at 2546 (remarks of Folger).
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1867 that the people ratified at the election of 1869,217 perhaps proving several delegates’ point
that the judiciary was of most concern to the people. The vote was rather close, 247,240 to
240,442.218 Still, the fact this article was approved when the rest of the work of the convention
was defeated by a vote of 290,456 to 223,935, and when the Democratic party gained control of
every branch of the state government,219 is impressive and suggests considerable popular
dissatisfaction with the state of the judiciary. It was most likely wise that the convention did not
directly recommend a return to the appointive system to be voted on in 1869. The stage was set
for battle in 1873.
B.

Railroad Scandals and the Times’ Crusade

Meanwhile, a storm was brewing that no doubt encouraged voters to ratify the judicial
reforms proposed by the convention of 1867 and also suggested the elite bar’s work was not
over. The railroad scandals would bring the corruption of the New York judiciary and
legislature to the attention of not only citizens of the state and the nation, but of foreigners as
well. The New York Times moved into high gear, trying to shame the bar into organizing and
finally getting its wish. Members of the elite bar were deeply involved in the scandals and made
vast sums from them, but nevertheless moved to make such litigation impossible in the future
through their gentlemanly Association.
New York was not alone in this era in producing scandals; they sprang up across the
country in alarming numbers in the wake of the Civil War. But those in New York did tend to be
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on a grander scale, and to have more colorful shenanigans and personalities involved, as befit the
financial capital of the nation. Old New Yorkers, who so prided themselves on financial
uprightness, took it hard. On April 9, 1868, George Templeton Strong despaired in his diary that
“[b]ench and bar settle deeper in the mud every year and every month. They must be near
bottom now.”220 But not quite at the bottom. Not long after, when the railroad scandal had
worsened, Strong wrote: “To be a citizen of New York is a disgrace. A domicile on Manhattan
Island is a thing to be confessed with apologies and humiliation.”221 Indeed, “The New Yorker
belongs to a community worse governed by lower and baser blackguard scum than any city in
Western Christendom, or in the world.”222
The most outrageous scandal, and the one most directly affecting the New York bench
and bar, was the struggle for control of the Erie Railroad that erupted in January 1868. We know
a good deal about this scandal, largely because of the tireless efforts of Charles Francis Adams,
Jr., of the famous Boston family.223 A tangled web of legal manoeuvers and counter-manoeuvers
grew out of Cornelius Vanderbilt’s battle to gain control of the Erie board of directors against a
formidable triumvirate who dominated the Erie board and were known as the “Erie clique”:
Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, and Jim Fisk. All three came from rather hardscrabble backgrounds, a
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far cry from old New York, and were already known for their dubious business methods. Each
side retained leaders of the bar as counsel. Charles O’Conor, an Irish Catholic lawyer and one of
the most prominent members of the New York bar at the time, represented Vanderbilt; David
Dudley Field represented the Erie clique. By the time the struggle was over, each side had hired
dozens more elite lawyers. On the Erie clique side, some of the most prominent of these were
Clarence A. Seward, nephew of Lincoln’s Secretary of State, and Evarts himself.
Soon all these leaders of the bar were carrying out complicated legal strategies of the
opposing sides that cast the entire New York legal system in disrepute. Each side obtained
numerous injunctions under dubious conditions, many of them nullifying other judges’
injunctions. Judge Barnard, as might be expected, was in the thick of the action. Under the
Code of Procedure that Field himself wrote, in equitable actions each of the eight districts of the
Supreme Court had statewide jurisdiction to issue injunctions. This created the potential for
clashing injunctions so amply realized in the Erie litigation; any of the judges sitting in any
district could nullify the order of another colleague, or find his own order nullified. It is unclear
whether Field had anticipated this problem when drafting the Code; he may have expected
judges would exercise a measure of comity and decline to nullify one another’s injunctions. As
it turned out, in the Erie litigation judges did not hesitate to do so and Field did not hesitate to
exploit this difficulty with his own Code to benefit his clients. Besides the scandal involving
contradictory injunctions, bribes of thousands of dollars were freely handed out to members of
the state legislature. In the end, Vanderbilt secretly arranged a settlement with the Erie clique.
Needless to say, the lawyers on both sides were paid vast sums in fees.
The spectacle prompted the belief among the public that the entire New York legal

63

system was hopelessly corrupt. Editorials poured out condemning the scandals, and the role of
the bench and bar in particular. The New York Times was among the loudest in its criticism, and
in June 1869 published a call for the bar to organize to fight judicial corruption. It is significant
that this call lauded the English bar and its hierarchical pattern of organization, recommending
them as a model for their New York City counterparts. According to the Times editorial, simply
holding a public meeting among members of the bar would not be sufficient: “The true remedy is
not in a public meeting, but in a permanent, strong and influential association of lawyers for
mutual protection and benefit.”224 The editorial went on to praise the English bar, particularly its
hierarchical form of organization, noting that “[i]n London and Liverpool such associations have
been found necessary and effective. They are known, we believe, as ‘The Benchers,’ and are
composed of the most prominent, able and independent members of the profession, and wield so
powerful an influence that the Judges are compelled to pay that regard to their collective power
which they fain would deny to that of their individual members.”225 In New York City, “[s]uch
an organization is sadly needed” because of rampant judicial corruption.226 In diagnosing the
problem, the Times made a somewhat veiled attack on judicial selection by election and on the
largely immigrant electorate. “Individually each lawyer is powerless to resist the influence of
the Judges; there is virtually a judicial ‘ring’ in this City, and always will be, as long as the
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Judges are chosen by the present constituency.”227 After this first ringing call upon the bar for
“united action and organization,”228 the Times steadily prodded the bar to take action over the
next few years.229 Other reform-minded newspapers eventually joined in.230
Members of the bar did nothing for months. In the meantime, yet another railroad
scandal erupted, further tarnishing the reputations of lawyers and the legal system. In this
version, it was Fisk and Gould who attempted to gain control of the relatively small Albany &
Susquehanna Railroad in upstate New York. Again injunctions rained down from all sides. An
apparent murder and a pitched physical battle for control of the railroad punctuated this scandal.
The legal system had broken down completely, unable to prevent physical violence over the
question of control of a relatively small corporation. The Times begged the bar to take action.
On December 16, 1869, the paper editorialized: “If it be the supineness, the guilty silence of the
lawyers, as officers of the people’s courts, which have brought us to our present pass, it is their
reawakened public spirit and activity which must help us back to a better state of things; we must
again proclaim that the bar must lead the way.”231
C.

Founding of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York

It is difficult to convey the sense of desperation one gets from reading lawyers’ accounts
at this time. Strong wrote in his diaries, “The stink of our state judiciary is growing too strongly
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ammoniac and hippuric for endurance. . . . People begin to tire of holding their noses, and are
looking about in a helpless way for some remedy.” Strong saw no remedy, however, “except by
a most perilous process, justified only by the extremist necessity, and after all constitutional
remedies are exhausted.”232 Breen sheds some light on the remedy Strong may have been darkly
hinting at. He describes a secret meeting of eight respectable leading citizens, merchants and
lawyers, at which lynching the Ring leaders and the worst Tweed judges was seriously
discussed, since the Tweed judges would block any judicial remedy.233
Under these circumstances, the bar did in fact begin to organize itself. George Martin,
the centennial historian of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, has ably
chronicled the Association’s origins in his 1970 history.234 The earliest moves to organize the
Association are somewhat shadowy, probably because the lawyers feared retribution from
judicial and political sources, including physical violence. From the beginning, there appear to
have been two separate purposes for the organization: first, forming a sort of club for the
gentlemanly portion of the bar, and second, promoting reform of bench and bar. Although these
two purposes need not necessarily have been contradictory, in practice there was often tension
between them.
In due course, a first meeting of subscribers was called for February 1, 1870, and was by
invitation only.235 At the organizational meeting, the two principal speakers–Henry Nicoll and
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William Evarts–had evidently prepared carefully and conveyed somewhat different emphases. It
is worth taking a look at each of these speeches to see what they reveal about the aspirations of
the elite bar at the time, and its potential to effect reform.
Nicoll was a New Yorker, much respected by the milieu of George Templeton Strong,
who would become the first chairman of the Association’s executive committee, and serve in
that capacity for four years. His speech, considerably the longer of the two, focused on the
degradation of the bar and particularly the loss of its elite status in the public eye and of rank
within it. The villain of his speech was the Constitution of 1846. However, he directed his ire
not so much toward the advent of judicial elections as toward the provisions affecting admission
to the bar. Nicoll did not mince his words as to the malign effects of the Constitution of 1846 on
the profession: “That Constitution, under which we still live, gave almost a death blow to the
legal profession. Disastrous effects could not but flow from the organic changes made by that
instrument.”236 The most serious problems, in his view, was the Constitution’s destruction of
differing ranks within the legal profession, based on seniority, and the loosening of requirements
to enter the profession.237
Nicoll was clear and unapologetic about the need for an aristocratic profession as a
leaven for a democratic polity.

In his view, the bar, under the provisions of the Constitution of

1846, “had been reduced to a mere collection of individuals without class or rank–a dull dreary
level of enforced equality.” This description evokes Tocqueville’s accounts of the potential
subscribers. That Field was invited came as a surprise to many, given his role in the Erie
scandals. Many in the bar looked upon him as part of the problem, not the solution.
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disadvantages of democracy. Nicoll confronted directly the strident claims of Jacksonian
democracy that had prompted the Constitution, and noted, “Perhaps it may sound strange in a
democratic community to talk in this way, but I apprehend that, outside of political rights and
relations, distinctions must exist everywhere–they are necessary for the very welfare of society.”
This passage provides a justification for Nicoll’s–and perhaps much of old New
York’s–reluctance to get involved in politics. It implies that politics is a rather artificial sphere
wholly separate from the rest of life, or “society,” and that in the political sphere “a dull dreary
level of enforced equality” must persist. However, in the organic, more natural society outside
that confined sphere, “distinctions must exist everywhere.” The artificial values of politics must
not interfere with that organic society; if so, great damage is done.
Nicoll was not simply advocating elitism and privileges for their own sake. He was
convinced that the high tone of the best of the bar would percolate down the social pyramid to
other members and indeed to the rest of the organic “society.” The theory that reforms initiated
by the best will percolate down the social pyramid is found in other contexts in writings
produced by old New Yorkers, and is of course characteristic of a society with a confident upper
class that expects deference (or at least an upper class that still hopes for deference).238 In the
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For example, in the introduction to their famous book The Decoration of Houses, Edith
Wharton and Ogden Codman write: “[I]f it be granted . . . that a reform in house-decoration, if
not necessary, is at least desirable, it must be admitted that such reform can originate only with
those whose means permit of any experiments with their taste may suggest. When the rich man
demands good architecture his neighbors will get it too. The vulgarity of current house
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costs less to follow than to oppose it.” Introduction, EDITH WHARTON & OGDEN CODMAN, JR.,
THE DECORATION OF HOUSES (republished 1978 W.W. Norton & Company, originally published
1897) (no page numbers). Wharton and Codman therefore call upon the rich, in many cases the
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case of the bar, this percolating down would be achieved by gathering in an association “all that
is intelligent, all that is honest, all that is honorable in this Profession” so that this elite might be
able “to create a spirit of professional brotherhood, to create in the members of our profession a
regard for the profession.”
The theory of the separate and artificial sphere of politics goes far to explaining why
Nicoll scarcely touched on the problem of the elected judiciary. The judiciary, unlike the bar,
seems to have been in his mind more fully and perhaps irredeemably subsumed into the sphere
of politics. (This was in contrast to the English model, where the bench and bar were more
closely knit together and the judiciary largely free from direct political influence.) Nicoll would
only say of judicial elections, that other notable effect of the Constitution of 1846 on the
profession, “It is unnecessary and it may be improper to speak of that now.” If he believed it
was possible that the judiciary might in fact be rescued from politics and reclaimed for the more
organic society, that feat lay in the future, after the elevation of the bar to its proper status.
In contrast, the New England-born Evarts’ speech was fired with zeal to reform the
judiciary. While Nicoll became chairman of the executive committee of the Association, Evarts
was its first president. By the time the Association was founded, he was already prominent in
national political and legal circles as a Republican. In general Evarts was more of a staunch
democrat with a small “d” than Nicoll, and did not emphasize an aristocratic element in the bar.

nouveaux riches, to fit themselves for their necessary position at the top of the social pyramid by
assimilating an old tradition. And in the text of the book, they clothe this old “percolating
down” theory in the mantle of the new social science: “It is a fact recognized by political
economists that changes in manners and customs, no matter under what form of government,
usually originate with the wealthy or aristocratic minority, and are thence transmitted to the other
classes.” Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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He did not hold with a theory of a separate sphere for politics, removed from the rest of society
and from the bar. And so at the Association’s organizational meeting in February 1870, unlike
Nicoll Evarts did not hesitate to inveigh against the judiciary and to call for political reform. He
unshrinkingly labeled the judiciary “that weakest portion of our political system, that portion that
has, or should have, no patronage or influence and no political authority,”239 but because of these
had become degraded. Evarts’ double use of the word “political” here suggests a somewhat
ambiguous attitude to politics, or the relationship of politics to law. On one hand, the judiciary
is said to be properly part of the “political system,” on the other hand, it should have “no
political authority.” In the first use of the word, Evarts seems to suggest a fundamental
constitutional role, in the second, entanglement with partisan politics. Whether these two forms
of politics can ever really be separated is not a question Evarts grapples with.
Nevertheless, Evarts the politician must have been aware that in order for the bar to help
disentangle the bench from corrupt partisan politics, some political involvement in the less lofty
sense would be necessary. Evarts made a few pointed references to recent scandals. In a
reference to the latest Erie scandal, Evarts declared, “Why, Mr. Chairman, you and I can
remember perfectly well (and we are not very old men) [Evarts was fifty-two at the time], when,
for a lawyer to come out from the chambers of a Judge with an ex parte writ that he could not
defend before the public, before the profession and before the Court, would have occasioned the
same sentiment toward him as if he came out with a stolen pocket-book.”240 He closed with the
statement that the Association’s goal should be to “restore the honor, integrity and fame of the

239

1 ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORTS 2, at 28 (1870).

240

Id.
70

profession in its two manifestations of the Bench and of the Bar.”241 Where Nicoll had discussed
only the one, Evarts was eager to take on the other as well.
Evarts’ reforming approach was backed up by a speech from a prominent member of the
opposite party: Samuel J. Tilden. Tilden, who was to become vice president of the Association,
was a well-respected lawyer and also chairman of the Democratic party in New York who had
won something of a reputation as a reformer in clashes with Tweed.242 It was therefore important
for the Association to have his blessing on its endeavors: the Association thus would have the
leadership of two prominent members of opposite parties in Evarts and Tilden. Tilden was not
scheduled to speak at the meeting, however, and had indeed risen to leave when Nicoll crossed
the room to urge him to say a few words.243 Tilden and Nicoll had both been delegates at the
Convention of 1846, and had voted against the changes to the judiciary and bar.244 Although
Tilden was unprepared, his speech did not lack fire. Tilden’s memorialist later said he “made the
most stirring speech of the hour . . . striking the keynote of the effective denunciation which
241
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aroused and quickened public sentiment to the need of instant action.”245 He began by
emphasizing the recent degradation of the bar:
Sir, it cannot be doubted–we can none of us shut our eyes to the fact–that there
has been, in the last quarter of a century, a serious decline in the character, in the
training, in the education, and in the morality of our Bar; and the first work for
this Association to do is to elevate the profession to a higher and a better standard.
[Applause.] If the Bar is to become merely a method of making money, making it
in the most convenient way possible, but making it at all hazards, then the Bar is
degraded. [Applause.] If the Bar is to be merely an institution that seeks to win
causes and to win them by back-door access to the judiciary, then it is not only
degraded, but it is corrupt. [Great applause.]246
Thus far, Tilden’s speech was not too far removed from Nicoll’s, although perhaps more pointed.
However, Tilden soon urged bolder action, claiming that “I am as peaceable a man as my friend
Nicoll, yet I confess that his words of peace sounded a little too strongly in my ears. The Bar, if
it is to continue to exist–if it would restore itself to the dignity and honor which it once
possessed–must be bold in defence [sic], and if need be, bold in aggression. [Great applause.]”247
The bar, Tilden declared, “can have reformed constitutions, it can have a reformed judiciary, it
can have the administration of justice made pure and honorable, and can restore both the
judiciary and the Bar, until it shall be once more, as it formerly was, an honorable and an
elevated calling. [Applause.]”248 Tilden confessed that “I do not know . . . in what form this is to
be done,” and noted that he had not taken part in the preliminary consultations toward forming
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the Association.249 However, he believed that forming such an organization was a necessary first
step. He concluded his remarks with a fundamental point which the others had failed to make,
about the continued prosperity of New York being dependent on the relatively pure
administration of justice:
[T]he city of New York is the commercial and monetary capital of this continent.
If it would remain so, it must establish an elevated character for its Bar, and a
reputation throughout the whole country for its purity in the administration of
justice. [Applause.] I had lately occasion to express the opinion in private which I
now repeat here to-night, that it is impossible for New York to remain the centre
of commerce and capital for this continent, unless it has an independent Bar and
an honest Judiciary. [Great applause.]250
Tilden’s speech gave backing to Evarts’ approach and helped to shift a majority of the
200 or so lawyers present in favor of a more crusading organization. (Even Nicoll eventually
came round to a more reform-minded view.) Some of the old New Yorkers such as George
Templeton Strong who attended the meeting were so sickened by recent scandals that they even
felt the speeches had not gone far enough. Strong wrote in his diary the day after the meeting:
“Speeches . . . were generally rather good, though too subdued in tone to suit my taste. But
Choate and others told me that they thought moderation is best at first. I have not much hope of
good from this movement, but it may possibly accomplish something.”251 The Times, in
covering the meeting, was more hopeful of progress.252
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As it turned out, the Association was further spurred by a bloody incident which occurred
not long after the organizational meeting. It concerned a leader of the group who formed the
Association, Dorman Eaton, who was to have nominated officers at the first official meeting of
the Association on February 15. On the night of February 12, as Eaton was returning home late,
he was attacked, brutally beaten, and left for dead. Robbery was almost certainly not the motive,
since Eaton’s assailants did not take his money or watch.253 There were several possible motives
for the attack besides Eaton’s role in the Association; Eaton had been active in other reform
efforts and had made powerful enemies. The New York Times declared the general opinion when
it editorialized that “some one of the persons whom Mr. Eaton offended by his attack on
dishonesty and corruption, deliberately hired an assassin to perform this work.”254 Members of
the Association, meeting two days later and horrified by the beating, while Eaton lay near death,
as their first official act after organizing offered a reward of $5,000 for the apprehension and
conviction of Eaton’s assailants.255 The assailants were not found, but, by accident, at the trial of
Fisk’s murderer over a year later, evidence emerged suggesting that Fisk was indeed behind the
attack.256
Eaton did in fact recover, and perhaps the main effect of the attack was to make him a
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more staunch reformer than ever. Indeed he gradually gave up his law practice after the attack
and devoted himself full-time to municipal reform;257 most significantly for our purposes, he
became the mouthpiece for the Association on the question of judicial elections.
In May 1870, as the Association was buying its new house and setting up a library, it was
also taking modest steps to clean up the judiciary. Governor John T. Hoffman, a Tweed protégé,
was about to appoint three judges from the Supreme Court in the city to sit (on the court’s
General Term) as an appellate court, and members of the Association rightly feared he would
appoint judges picked by Tweed.258 To try to head off this result, the Association quickly formed
a committee of well-respected lawyers to present a memorial to the governor asking that judges
from outside the city be appointed, so as to limit Tweed’s influence. (The committee included
Charles O’Conor, Henry Nicoll, Wheeler H. Peckham, William E. Curtis, and Joseph H.
Choate–a high-powered group indeed.)259 Tweed somehow learned of the Association’s nascent
action and telegraphed Hoffman asking for immediate appointment of Judges Barnard, Cardozo,
and Ingraham, all three known to be in Tweed’s pocket. The governor responded quickly and
favorably to Tweed’s request, and the frustrated committee reported back to the Association that
its proposed action was too late.
The Association’s halting efforts at reform were moving too slowly for some in the press.
In March 1871 The Albany Law Journal, reflecting the more populist spirit of upstate New
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Yorkers, took the new Association to task for concentrating on “social intercourse . . . for the
four hundred or so gentlemen who enjoy the advantages” the Association conferred while
neglecting political reform.260 It urged a broad expansion of the Association’s membership and
pointed to the success of the unorganized bar in achieving passage of lengthened tenure for
judges in 1869 as evidence of what the whole bar acting together might accomplish,261 and
lamented the fact that “the influence of the organization is seen neither in court nor legislature.”
D.

The Bar’s Role in the Early Reform Movement to End the Ring: Public
Meetings and the Election of 1871

In fact, the Association was prompted to take some action for legal reform by a
controversial figure, Field. On February 7, 1871, Field argued that the Association should send a
memorial to the state legislature with proposed changes to the Code of Procedure concerning
receivers’ appointments, referees’ fees, and allowances.262 His initiative spurred the hitherto
inactive committee on amendment of the law, and on February 21 the Association did in fact
vote to send a memorial to the legislature with Field’s three proposed changes to the Code.263
Unfortunately, the legislature sat on the memorial without acting, but at least the Association had
taken the first steps toward urging reform. A few others followed: in April 1871 Evarts
appointed a committee on extortions to investigate “illegal fees and perquisites” public officials
extorted from lawyers. In May 1871, James Carter, one of the members most anxious for reform
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by political means, urged at an executive committee meeting that the Association oppose
amendments to the Code of Procedure which would “seriously cripple[]” the jurisdiction of
certain civil courts in the city, “greatly impede[]” the right of citizens to obtain redress against
corporations, and allow courts to punish by fine and imprisonment, without trial by jury, “the
free and public expression of opinion upon the conduct of judicial tribunals.”264 Another
committee was formed and went on a successful trip to Albany to persuade the governor to veto
these amendments to the Code, which had been passed by the legislature.
Suddenly in the summer of 1871 the Times received incontrovertible proof of the Ring’s
vast frauds. Former sheriff James O’Brien, bitter at the Ring’s refusal to pay his “extras” while
its leaders appropriated millions for themselves, gave George Jones of the Times a pile of
transcripts from the books of the city comptroller, Richard Connolly.265 Jones ran a series of
stories that summer that created a sensation. Public calls for further action swelled.
Members of the Association were prominent in the public meetings and calls for reform
which followed. On September 4, 1871, a public meeting to address city corruption was held at
Cooper Union. Thousands showed up, and many had to be turned away for lack of space.
Breen, who was at the meeting, described it as follows: “The foremost men of the city attended.
They occupied seats on the platform, looking dark and determined. The auditorium was packed
with merchants and business men, doctors and lawyers, mechanics and clerks. The public
intelligence and the public conscience had awakened to the disgrace and danger of the
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situation.”266 After several speeches, one by prominent Association member Judge James Emott,
a committee on resolutions was appointed, which included several members of the Association.
Of the seven committee members, three were Joseph H. Choate, James Emott, and Henry Nicoll.
While the committee was in session in an adjoining room, there were several more speeches
denouncing Tammany Hall, after which Choate came out and read twelve long resolutions, the
gist of which was that the city had endured gross financial mismanagement because of Tweed
and the Ring, that Tweed and the Ring should be defeated at the next election, the Tweed
municipal charter should be repealed, as much money as possible recovered for the treasury, and
a committee of seventy members be appointed to carry out these goals.267 The meeting bore fruit
rapidly. On October 17, Charles O’Conor was appointed special state attorney general to
recover money stolen from the city. He in turn chose as his associates Evarts, Emott, and
Wheeler H. Peckham. The next week Tilden, on behalf of the Committee of Seventy, swore out
a warrant for Tweed’s arrest for deceit and fraud. On October 27, the warrant was served and
bail set at one million dollars, most of which was posted by Jay Gould.268
Meanwhile the election of 1871 was fast approaching. The Association got involved in
selection of judicial candidates in two ways: by working with politicians to encourage
appropriate nominations and by opposing unworthy candidates. In September 1871 the
executive committee resolved to recommend appointing a special committee to confer with “the
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political organizations” to secure nomination of suitable candidates.269 After an “animated
discussion” at the Association’s meeting on October 10 with several different proposals, the
members voted to set up a special committee, composed of 15 members, authorized only to
“report such measures as they may deem advisable” to secure election of suitable and competent
judges.270 This committee did work with the political parties, probably securing the nomination
of George Barrett for the Supreme Court as a result, and joined the Committee of Seventy in
opposing Barrett’s opponent, Tweed nominee Thomas A. Ledwith. The Association agreed to
publish in the newspapers a resolution stating that it considered Ledwith’s nomination as “that of
a man who was not a lawyer,” and that it “must be regarded as dictated by political or selfish
motives, and in our opinion should be condemned by the people.” Ledwith was indeed defeated
and Barrett elected, although it is difficult to say what effect the Association’s resolution had.
But some members of the Association were convinced it had played a significant role and were
emboldened to go after corrupt sitting judges.
E.

Ethnic Tensions Rising

As a result of the November 1871 elections, in which Tweed lost supporters and the
reformers won seats, the reform movement seemed secure, and bound to be effective. However,
the campaign stirred up immense ethnic tension that was to cause the movement trouble in the
long run. Ethnic invective poured from newspapers on both sides, and seemed almost to portray
a war of the English against the Irish, mirroring that in the old countries.
The large German community in New York to some extent stayed out of the rancorous
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ethnic debate. Several newspaper editors, leaders of the German community, were staunchly in
favor of the reform movement and so disarmed criticism of that group. For example, at the
celebrated September 4 reform meeting at the Cooper Union, Oswald Ottendorfer, editor of the
New York paper Staats Zeitung, and “a leader of the German element in New York, delivered a
strong, fervid and powerful denunciation of the Tammany thieves.”271 And Joseph Pulitzer,
another leader of the New York German community, was editor of the World, which crusaded
tirelessly for reform. But, as noted below, the World did take umbrage at anti-immigration
sentiment and anti-Catholicism in the Times.
The newspapers therefore, in their frequent invocations of ethnicity, or what was then
known as “race,” primarily concerned themselves with attacking the Irish and counter-attacking
those of English origin. The print battle over race raged throughout 1870 and 1871, as the fight
over the Ring gained momentum. The anti-Irish forces struck hard. The Evening Post, which
applauded the bar’s efforts at reform, was among the more circumspect members of New York’s
press, stating that Tweed’s home voting district was comprised of “the least intelligent, the most
bigoted, and, to a great extent, the most vicious population.”272 The Nation denounced the “folly
and wickedness of the Irish.”273 The Times took the toughest line of all, declaring that the Irish
were not “true American[s],”274 and that the Catholic Church sought to supplant secular
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authority.275 Illustrating the connection between its view of the Irish and organized bar, the
Times declared that the “whole Celtic race” must “take an inferior position in the progress of
races” in a column that ran next to its laudatory coverage of Evarts’ attacks on the Tweed
Ring.276 And Thomas Nast, whose famous cartoons in Harper’s Weekly were among the most
effective weapons against the Tweed Ring, portrayed the Catholics of Tammany Hall as reptilian
creatures.277
The Irish-sympathizing press hit back, accusing the Anglophilic press of being elitist,
aristocratic, and fundamentally anti-democratic. (Its fervor was no doubt increased by memories
of conflict back in the old country.) Thus did the Democrat-leaning Sun attack the Times, which
had instigated the bar’s reform efforts, as a group of “arrogant Englishmen” who “lived by
denouncing American Judges.”278 That both the Times and its ally in judicial reform, the Nation,
pointed to the British bench as a model played into this accusation.279 Still another Democratic
publication lambasted the Times for its anti-Catholicism.280 In an era in which recent immigrants
had, at least in the eyes of the Democratic press, real reasons to fear disenfranchisement at the
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hands of Republicans in Albany,281 such appeals to ethnic solidarity must have resonated. Given
the large numbers of recent immigrants who recently had become naturalized citizens, and in the
city soon outnumbered native-born New Yorkers on the voting rolls, such ethnic tensions did not
help the reforms espoused by New York City’s bar.282
F.

The Bar’s Role in the Trials of Ring Judges

While ethnic tension raged in the press, the reform movement marched on. Although the
Association was helping to keep bad judges such as Ledwith off the bench, the worst of the
Tweed judges remained. Strong fumed in his diary about the Association’s timidity in December
1871: “The Association is pusillanimous; its members are afraid to get up a cause against
Barnard, Cardozo and Company, though abundant proof of corruption is within their reach.” He
attributed this lack of action to cowardice, since “[i]f they should fail, Barnard and the others
would be hostile to them, and they would lose clients.” He was so frustrated that he wrote, “I
feel inclined to resign from this Bar Association.”283
In fact, encouraged by the results of the election of 1871, the Association was already
moving to take on the corrupt judges. In January 1871, the Association voted to present a
memorial to the legislature with an attached report. The memorial stated that for some time the
administration of justice in the city had “failed to command that measure of public confidence
281
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which is essential in order that it may accomplish its beneficent ends.”284 Furthermore, this was
known not only in New York but throughout the country and abroad, thanks to a vigorous press:
“charges directly impeaching the judicial integrity of some of the judges upon the bench in the
said city, have been repeatedly made in the most explicit manner in many of the principal
journals of the day, and thus circulated throughout the United States and foreign countries.”285
Echoing Tilden’s argument made at the organizational meeting of the Association, the memorial
went on to point out that New York’s poor reputation for justice might well endanger its standing
as a commercial capital: “in these and in other ways the administration of justice in said city, and
the honor and fair fame not only of that city but also of the State have become widely involved in
doubt and suspicion; and . . . capitalists have been alarmed, and important commercial and
financial enterprises have been diverted from said city, and that its general prosperity is likely to
be still further materially retarded.”286 The memorial went on to refer to the election in
November 1871 as a “popular uprising” whose fruits should not be squandered by failure to take
action against the judges.287
Therefore the memorial called on the legislature to institute a “rigid inquiry” and to apply
“such remedies . . . as the results of the inquiry may demand.”288 As a part of the memorial, the
Association included the committee’s report summarizing the various types of misconduct the
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corrupt judges had engaged in, although it did not mention any of the judges by name.289
Members of the Association were active in the investigations and proceedings that
followed; indeed they in effect acted as counsel to the legislative committees and Senate. Three
members of the Association–Joshua Van Cott, John E. Parsons, and Albert Stickney–spent all
their time on the hearings and the later proceedings, about six months total. The Association
provided financial support for their efforts.290 The Assembly referred the memorial to its
judiciary committee, which in turn held lengthy hearings in New York City to investigate the
accusations. The investigation focused on three judges: Barnard and Cardozo of the Supreme
Court, and John H. McCunn, of the Superior Court.291 The committee recommended to the
Assembly impeachment for all three judges. At that point, Judge Cardozo resigned, despite an
alleged agreement between himself and Judge Barnard that neither would resign, thereby
cementing his reputation as the most despicable member of the ring.292 The Assemby voted to
impeach Barnard but urged that McCunn’s case be dealt with more informally; it submitted
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charges to the governor and recommended that the Senate investigate them. In the end, the
Senate held trials for both judges during the summer of 1872. The charges against each were
carefully chosen, and included allegations concerning appointment of receivers and referees and
grants of ex parte injunctions.293 Despite the efforts of Barnard’s counsel to suggest that the
Association was attacking Barnard for political reasons,294 both judges were convicted and
removed from office.
G.

1873 Referendum on Judicial Elections: The Bar Meets Defeat

The spectacle of judges on trial for offenses involving massive corruption encouraged the
Association as it launched its most far-reaching effort to undo the damage wrought by the
Constitution of 1846: the referendum on judicial elections at the election of 1873. This
referendum, as described above, originated in the constitutional convention of 1867.295 Many
respected members of the bar believed that overturning judicial elections and returning to
appointment by the governor with confirmation by the senate would provide a systemic solution
to the bench’s problems, so amply demonstrated by the recent corruption trials. Advocates of
293
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reform believed themselves to be aided not just by the recent judicial corruption trials, but also
by the ongoing trials of Boss Tweed beginning in January 1873, which eventually led to his
conviction and prison sentence.
Encouraged by such public evidence of corruption in the current system, the Association
and its members threw themselves into promoting the referendum against judicial elections.296
The reformers in the spring of 1873 were confident they could undo the damage done by the
Constitution of 1846. In April 1873, the Nation boldly predicted that the referendum would
begin the “third period of constitution-making in the United States,” in which the people would
demand a curtailment of the widespread Republicanism that sprang from the 1846 constitution.297
Also in April 1873, the Association began to prepare its campaign. It arranged to publish a
resolution in favor of judicial appointment in various newspapers, and Association members
spoke forcefully at public gatherings in favor of reform. Shortly before the vote the Association
published a brief and forcefully argued pamphlet in favor of judicial appointment.298 Although it
was signed by Evarts, in fact it was probably written by Dorman Eaton, the reformer who had
been attacked and brutally beaten in 1871. Eaton wrote a much longer pamphlet for the Union
League Club and the New York Council of Political Reform in which he laid out the same
arguments in greater detail and with supporting facts.299
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Eaton, who included tables of statistics in the longer version of the pamphlet, argued that
elected judges were of lower quality than appointed ones. He attempted to show that since
judges were elected there were more appeals, new trials, and reversals in civil cases. In criminal
cases, he tried to show there were lower numbers of convictions per arrest.300 Of course, modern
wariness of statistics would lead us to probe into all sorts factors besides election of judges that
could produce such shifts. Eaton himself seemed to believe his powerful argument was “the
unexampled number of five judges . . . awaiting trial for official corruption [in 1872]–a number
greater than were arraigned in the whole period of appointed judges in this state from 1777 to
1846.”301
Eaton argued that the system of judicial elections had corrupted both the bench and the
bar. According to the address to the voters, “Judicial elections have, in our opinion, as a rule,
been unfavorable to the selection of man of the greatest ability and attainments for the bench,
and not less unfavorable to the prevalence of courage and fidelity in the discharge of judicial
functions.”302 The process of elections itself was incompatible with the judicial office. “The
judicial canvass is in its very nature demoralizing, and the temptation is dangerously strong to
make commitments unfavorable to justice. The judge who reaches the bench through a party
contest at the polls, where one portion of the people support and the other oppose him, by no
means finds it as easy to be impartial, nor do lawyers and suitors find it as easy to believe him
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impartial, as if he had been appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate.”303 With the
bench so perverted, the bar could not but be corrupted also.
Such selections have also been prejudicial to learning and character among
lawyers. Lawyers of inferior capacity, aspiring to the bench, have been induced
to intrigue for caucus and party influence, and thus the more honorable conditions
of professional advancement have been disparaged and neglected. Much in the
same ratio in which inferior lawyers have been able to reach the bench, under the
elective system, persons of small education and uncertain character have made
their way at the bar.304
Last, but not least, judicial elections had bolstered the power of the Ring. “The election of
judges, by giving more offices to be made the subject of bargaining and intrigues by the
managers of popular elections, has increased the number and power of those party mercenaries
who live by the spoils of elections, and the same cause has aggravated the excessive power of the
mere party majority.”305 This argument smacks a bit of criticism of popular politics, and indeed
such an aristocratic attitude may well have soured some voters on the proposal.
The reformers had hoped that the shocking evidence of corruption revealed by the trials
of McCunn, Barnard, and Tweed combined with their own campaign efforts would give the
measure a fighting chance, but they were destined to be disappointed. The people voted 319,979
to 115,337 against appointment.306 Voters in rural areas voted especially strongly to continue to
elect judges, although the city vote was lopsided too. In general, Republicans and reform
Democrats lost ground to Tammany Hall Democrats, possibly due to the economic downturn
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caused by the financial panic of 1873.307
With respect to the farmers of upstate New York, it seems that distrust of the bar for its
role in the Anti-Rent wars was still strong. And rural voters most likely perceived fewer
problems with the elective system in their areas. Jacksonian theories remained powerful in rural
areas and were regarded as workable; in contrast, many believed cities were unfit for Jacksonian
democracy.308 As one bar association later noted, “in rural counties, unlike our city counties, the
Judges are chosen by voters who know them personally, and who thus give some substantial
consideration to their characters and abilities.”309 Agrarian regions, in other words, continued to
exhibit the same social conditions that led some states to elect justices of the peace since the
1700s. Rural areas did not share the circumstances that made judicial elections problematic in
cities.310 After weighing the evidence, one contemporary critic could reach only the conclusion
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that judicial elections failed in large cities.311 Even Eaton conceded that the elective system did
not affect rural areas as badly as it affected cities,312 which was a pattern that repeated itself
throughout the United States.313 More than half a century later, this phenomenon would continue
to bedevil would-be reformers: as one critic of the elective judiciary complained, in rural areas
“people say, ‘We are getting good judges now, so why change?’”314 The same pattern of rural
voters favoring judicial elections persisted into the late 20th century, when New Yorkers in 1979
finally voted to make the Court of Appeals appointive.315
In New York City, voters were not entitled to such a sanguine view of their judiciary.
There, the vast immigrant vote was decisive, and the reformist press had harshly criticized
immigrants, the Irish in particular, as essentially unfit to govern themselves. Most likely, for
many voters, issues of ethnicity and class outweighed any desire to see reform triumph. They
may also have believed that enough had already been done to set the New York judiciary on a
better path.
V.

Conclusion
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Despite the elite bar’s failure to win ratification of an appointive system, much judicial
reform had been accomplished in a short time. Although Tammany Hall was not eliminated,
judicial corruption was greatly lessened. In 1895, James C. Carter wrote to the governor about
the Supreme Court justices in New York city, “I suppose all of them owe their positions pretty
much to Tammany Hall, and I have been surprised at two things: first, that that organization
should have selected such good men, and, second, that they should have exhibited so little
subserviency to the power to which they are indebted for their places.”316 The same could not be
said of the bench 25 years previously. In its 50th anniversary celebrations, the Association of the
Bar was justly self-congratulatory about the role it had played in cleaning up the bench. The
reforms of the Constitutional Convention of 1867 and the Association’s working to remove
corrupt judges had each had a significant effect.
The bar’s achievements in reforming the judiciary paved the way for improvements in
municipal government and for its defeat of Field’s Civil Code in the 1880's. A respectable
judiciary meant New York’s rise to national and international commercial prominence could
continue unimpeded. The elite bar hoped to further assure that result by limiting the power of
legislatures over basic commercial law. Legislatures, elite lawyers feared, were prone to capture
by the unscrupulous rich or by redistributionist poor. A civil code in the legislature’s hands
would soon become an instrument to aid one or the other of these groups, or both.317 Assuming a
reasonably honest and competent judiciary, the common law was the better instrument to deal
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with commercial law. James Carter and the Association of the Bar did their utmost to thwart
passage of the Civil Code, and they succeeded. Although legislative solutions later gained
ground with the progressives, the legacy of men such as Carter did not die out entirely. The U.S.
Supreme Court built up a sort of common law of individual liberties, including economic
liberties, at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. That legacy lives
on, albeit in altered form, in certain of the Supreme Court’s individual rights cases today.318
The New York bar’s more successful efforts showed the wisdom of not trying to
completely abolish judicial elections, but of taking the more indirect approach of lengthening
terms. The bar could thereby more effectively parry charges of anti-democratic elitism.
Although some states did succeed in eliminating judicial elections, many others have found relief
from some of the worst aspects of judicial elections by lengthening terms or adopting retention
elections. I will explore the changes to the elective system of judges in other states after the
Civil War in future work.
This history also demonstrates that, in the area of judicial elections, at least,
organizations within the bar had an important role to play. Several things about the New York
bar’s involvement were significant. First, the Association of the Bar was made up of a small and
committed group, not the entire bar. Second, members went out of their way to make sure the
Association was bipartisan. Reform-minded Democrats were as welcome as Republicans, and
the emphasis on bipartisanship greatly increased the Association’s effectiveness. The American
Judicature Society (founded 1913), which developed the merit selection plan and retention
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elections, is another example of a committed and nonpartisan group within the bar carrying out
successful reform of judicial elections. Certain members of the elite bar during this period went
some way toward justifying Evarts’ remark that “we lawyers, not less than judges, are sworn in
our duty to subserve the interests of the State; and a good, and an able lawyer, I think, may claim
for the exercise of his profession the honor of advancing the glory of the State, protecting the
interests of the community, and serving the public good.”319
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